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ABSTRACT
Contemporary Perceptions of the Solidarity Movement Held by Polish Nationals

by
Nathan Peter-Grzeszczak Buhr

Widespread participation in the 1980s Solidarity movement by Polish nationals of both
genders, varying ideologies, and differing political backgrounds has led to diverse views
of the history and narrative of the movement that today is interpreted in differing ways by
groups and individuals. To gain a better understanding of how Poles view this unique
time period of their history a survey featuring 54 questions was dispatched to and
completed by over 121 Polish nationals. All questions relate to the Solidarity movement
in categories covering: Prominent People, Media, Economics, Religion, and Education
and concluding with a free-write section for additional comments by participants. The
results show near common agreement on some points while in other areas participants
expressed conflicting opinions and views. These varying perspectives reflect the ongoing
debate concerning the ethos of the Solidarity movement in addition to its effect on
contemporary Polish culture.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Widespread participation in the 1980s Solidarity movement by Polish nationals of
both genders, all classes, varying ideologies, and differing political backgrounds has led
to diverse views of the history and narrative of the movement that today is interpreted
widely by groups and individuals. The Solidarity movement brought a majority of Poles
together for a common purpose. The broken promises and propaganda of the Communist
Polish United Workers Party1 created a Polish citizenry that was increasingly distrustful
of the government. As national trust in the government and economic conditions
declined to abysmal levels, Poles began to look for ways to revolt and demand the
modification of a system that was so obviously failing them. The era of the Solidarity
movement was a complex period of transcendence for the citizens of Poland as the people
rallied together in a grand moment of unity.
Scholars of varying academic backgrounds and disciplines write many insightful
statements about the Solidarity movement. In the words of historian Timothy Garton
Ash, “Solidarity was the most infectiously hopeful movement in the history of
contemporary Europe, and its long-term legacy if one of hope.”2 Professor of theology
Gerald J. Beyer comments in reference to what Poles felt during the Solidarity
movement, “the most important thing was an unusually intense experience of community.
The most essential meaning of the initial solidarity was the widespread awareness of the

1
2

Communist Polish United Workers Party will be shortened to PZPR in this paper
Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 351.

9

deep bond with others.”3 Polish economist Gedymin Spychalski shares the statement,
“Solidarity was a trade union only in name. In fact, it was a mass political movement
acting on behalf of internal changes which, at its peak of its development, numbered no
less than one-third of the country’s total population.”4 In the words of Polish sociologist
Stanisław Starski5, written in 1982:
The Polish working class has definitely demonstrated that the future of socialismif by socialism we understand the reconstruction of society in a way which allows
the labor providing masses, the working class, to achieve political, economic and
cultural emancipation and to coordinate more directly the development of
macrostructural organizations-is in the struggle to overcome the legacy of the
state as the political superorganization of modern society.6
With a number of scholars writing about the Solidarity movement from differing
perspectives there are no doubt varied interpretations of what the movement stood for,
what it accomplished, and how its legacy continues in Poland today.
How do Polish nationals feel about the Solidarity movement today? This is the
question I address with this research. The political and cultural drama that unfolded in
the 1980s Poland may be seen and interpreted in many contrasting ways to fit worldview
and ideology of an individual. Firstly, in this research I looked to see if individuals and
groups in Poland understand the Solidarity movement in different ways today, and
secondly sought to uncover any commonalities or trends that may group individuals
together.
The balance of power between the state and the people, between the individual
and the collective, between the powerful and the weak, between the influential and
3

Gerald J. Beyer, Recovering Solidarity: Lessons from Poland’s Unfinished Revolution (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 12.
4
Gedymin Spychalski. “Catholic Social Thought and Socio-economic and Political Transformation in
Poland” Review of Business 22 (Fall 2001): 33
5
Stanisław Starski is a pseudonym adopted by the author for political reasons.
6
Stanisław Starski, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (Boston: South End Press, 1982), 242.
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ineffective, these are a few of the large and daunting issues that drew me to this topic and
in this thesis I address them in the context of the Polish Solidarity movement.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF THE SOLIDARITY MOVMENT

Poland Pre-World War II
Trouble for the nation of Poland began in 1772. Being centrally located in
Europe and having roughly 75 percent of its borders with other countries, Poland often
faced challenges from its neighbors. The parameters of Poland were in constant flux
throughout the nation’s history. These challenges were at times more than the Poles
could fend off and multiple times Poland fell under the rule of others. As Timothy
Garton Ash highlights in his book The Polish Revolution Solidarity, Poland has a long
history of being occupied and ruled from abroad. During the partitions of Poland in
1772, 1793 and 1795 the state of Poland was erased from the map and divided up among
Prussia, Russia, and Austria.1 Amidst these difficult times, facing those who wished to
conquer and incorporate their territory, the people of Poland managed to resist by
persistently maintaining a distinct sense of their own culture.
One way the Polish people differentiated themselves from their neighbors was
though religion. By maintaining strong ties to the Roman Catholic Church Poles were
able to draw a distinct line between themselves and the German Protestant or the Russian
Orthodox traditions.2 Therefore, for most Poles, to be Polish was, and is, to be Roman
Catholic.3 In 2010 Gerald Beyer stated, “To this day, more that 90 percent of all Poles

1

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 4.
Ibid.
3
While The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religion in Poland, varying denominations of the
religious tradition exist as well. The Polish National Catholic Church for example was founded in the
United States by Polish immigrants and is a Christian organization not in communion with the Pope.
Another example is the Polish Catholic Church that is also not in communion with the Pope. Other
2
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identify themselves as Roman Catholic. This means that in a country of almost 39
million people, approximately 35 million are Roman Catholic.”4 As I will show later, this
strong tie with the Catholic Church aided in the organization and support of the Solidarity
movement.
The beginning of World War II brought a “Fourth Partition” of Poland. Poland
was divided between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 5 according to
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939.6 As the first country invaded by Nazi
Germany on September 1, 19397, Poland was involved in the war to 1945, longer than
any other country.8 Shortly after Germany struck, on September 17, 1939, the Soviet
Union advanced into Polish territory.9 Compared to other countries involved in World
War II, Poland lost the largest percentage of its pre-war population. Poland was located
between the battling nations of Germany and the Soviet Union, and the country was used
as a bargaining chip by the two powers. The Polish people were not only under direct
attack from both sides but were also caught in the crossfire between the armies of
Germany and the Soviet Union. In the words of Tony Judt in his book Post War: A
History of Europe Since 1945, “Poland lost about one in five of her pre-war population,
including a far higher percentage of the educated population, deliberately targeted for
destruction by the Nazis.”10 World War II was a very dark time in the history of Poland.

religions communities present in Poland today are a number of non-Catholic Christian denominations,
Jewish, Muslim, Hare Krishnas and Karaims.
4
Beyer, Recovering Solidarity, 162.
5
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will hereafter be referred to as USSR or Soviet Union.
6
Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982,
433.
7
Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany prior to the declaration of war.
8
Davies, God’s Playground, 435.
9
Ibid., 437.
10
Tony Judt, Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 18. Poles also
suffered population loss under Soviet wartime occupation.
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The battles, genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities that occurred within the presentday borders of Poland have been well documented by historians but fall outside the scope
of this paper. To summarize, the Nazi German labor camps and death camps decimated
the population of Polish Jews and other minorities during the holocaust. I present this
record to show that World War II forever changed the fabric of Polish society and
culture. Post-World War II Poland was increasingly homogeneous in ethnicity and
religion to a level that had not been seen in previously in Polish history.

Poland Post-World War II
The bloodshed, chaos, and conflict of World War II came to a halt in Europe in
April 1945. President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union met at
Yalta on the Crimean peninsula (part of present day Ukraine) from February 4th to the
11th in 1945 to discuss issues facing the “Big Three”.11 Among the topics addressed at
the conference were the surrender of Nazi Germany, reparations to be paid to of war-torn
nations by those deemed responsible, future national boundaries, and other issues
concerning post-war Europe. According to the Yalta agreement Poland was to be a
“free” independent nation with free elections but within the Soviet sphere of influence.
The leaders of the USSR felt that a buffer zone was needed between Russia and
Germany, so the Soviets were keen on keeping Poland under their close supervision. At
the time of the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union controlled the nation of Poland. The
Red Army had fought hard to gain the territory of Poland, so Roosevelt and Churchill

11

Norman Davies, Europe: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1036.
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reluctantly agreed that Stalin and the Soviets could keep the country within her sphere of
influence.12
With new borders established and the promise of free elections, the people of
Poland briefly appeared to be making a fresh start in a direction of their own choosing,
but instead the transition proved to be the replacement of one difficult situation for
another. Peace was at last established in the nation of Poland, but the Soviet occupiers
imposed new hardships. Censorship and propaganda became a daily reality for all living
in Poland as the state monopolized information exchange.13 In his book God’s
Playground: A History of Poland, Norman Davies states:
From its headquarters in Warsaw, the Main Office for the Control of Press,
Publications, and Public Spectacles (GUKPPiW) runs an elaborate network of
local branches. Its officers, who are permanently employed on the premises of all
major organizations and concerns, regulate the activities of all media, all news,
and translation agencies, all publishing houses, all printing-shops, all concerts,
theaters, cinemas, and exhibitions, and all other means of communication.14
The policies and regulations mandated by the USSR and imposed by the PZPR began to
dictate and control almost all aspects of Polish life.
The agenda of the USSR was to promote its ideology in Poland and work towards
the Sovietization of Polish culture. This fit into the larger goal of the USSR to influence
and shape the mentality of those under its control in order to build a common sense of
identity among all peoples of the USSR and its satellite states.15 Author Vladislav Zubok
in his book A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to
12

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 3.
Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland Vol. II 1795 to the Present (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982), 594.
14
Ibid.
15
Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 61.
13
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Gorbachev contends, “ Stalin’s socialist empire used powerful ideology, nationalism, and
social engineering to refashion society and elites. It introduced the uniformity of state
industrialization and party systems. At the same time, it took away civil freedoms,
wealth, cooperation, and human dignity and offered instead an illusion of social
justice.”16 Ash, as well, cites the goals of Stalin, specifically in regards to Poland, “Stalin
himself said that introducing communism to Poland was like putting a saddle on a cow;
the Poles thought it was like putting a yoke on a stallion. This fundamental, historic
opposition and incompatibility is the most basic cause of the Polish revolt against ‘Yalta’
and Soviet socialism in 1980.”17 The people of Poland largely resented the pressures of
the occupying USSR and eventually began to push back against the rules, laws,
traditions, and customs promoted vigorously by the Soviets.
In addition to suffering from the cultural and psychological effects of Soviet
domination, Polish citizens also suffered from scarcities of food and goods, especially
because supplies of food and goods varied greatly from day-to-day and week-to-week
throughout Poland. Production and distribution of foodstuffs were not guaranteed, so
when items were available they could be purchased, but often store shelves were empty.18
The price of food was fixed by the PZPR, so cost of food was not the issue, the issue was
often the supply.19
In communist states the country is run by a ruling party that makes all decisions
about the economy, industry, and governance unilaterally without the dissent of an
opposition party. This central planning existed in communist Poland where the PZPR

16

Zubok, A Failed Empire, 61.
Ash, The Polish Revolution, 6.
18
Ibid, 13.
19
Ibid,.
17
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controlled all economic activity. Post-World War II Poland was separated from its past
of being a primarily agricultural economy to becoming one of industry and
manufacturing.20 While this shift in economy moved Poland towards a more modern and
competitive future, Davies claims that the PZPR was struggling in its leadership of
industry. In the words of Davies, “the endless list of negative deformations freely
admitted by the Party, include ‘deficient technology innovations’, ‘poor organization of
labor’, ‘excessive consumption of raw materials’, ‘wastage of power’, ‘faulty coordination’, ‘inattention to quality’, ‘under-investment in the consumer sector’, and ‘poor
social and work conditions’.”21 Davies goes on to say, “Poland’s second Industrial
Revolution has brought more comfort to the statisticians than to the ordinary
consumer.”22 Not only did industry fail to function in an efficient manner, but also the
bounty of the labor was not distributed in a balanced and equal way, as party members
involved in governance were increasingly better compensated than industrial workers.
Starting in the 1950s the People’s Republic of Poland23 began to run a trade
imbalance and was importing more than it was exporting. As the republic became
increasingly dependent on imported goods, it began to accumulate a large debt with
western countries. In the book Poland, Solidarity, Walesa author Michael Dobbs
comments on the economic situation of Poland, stating, “In 1973, Poland owed the West
only $2.5 billion. By 1976, the Polish debt rose to $11 billion, to reach, four years later,
over $20 billion. This was used not only for the purchase of machines and consumer

20

Davies, God’s Playground, 595.
Ibid., 595-596.
22
Ibid.
23
People’s Republic of Poland or PRL
21
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goods, but also for raw material imports.”24 Borrowing of this magnitude was needed to
keep the inefficient economy of Poland growing, but an import-export imbalance of this
kind proved to be unsustainable for the long term.
Another factor working against Poland was the requirement that it export certain
goods to the USSR. The Soviet empire was unique in that some of its satellite states were
wealthier in resources and capital than was the mother country. This led the USSR to
require certain materials and food to be exported to Russia for the benefit of its citizens
regardless of scarcity or need at the point of production.25 In the article “1988 Polish
Crisis: Worse than 1980-81” author Konstantin George states, “Soviet Policy has been
and remains to be to loot Poland, and for that matter, all its Eastern European satellites, as
much as possible. Given Soviet war economy requirements, this looting will increase, to
meet the demands of the Soviet war and civilian economy.”26 This angered many Poles
because they saw materials and food leaving their country that were often times sorely
needed for the Polish people, creating further resentment of the Soviet rule.
In Post-World War II Poland, as in other communist countries, a separate class of
citizens began to emerge who became to be known as nomenklatura. This group
consisted of PZPR party officials who enjoyed a certain amount of power, access to
goods and services, and freedom that were denied to regular citizens. For example, one
report written by a group of Polish physicians in May 1979 sought to expose “the
increasingly apparent stratification of health care, with the elite enjoying their own

24

Michael Dobbs, K.S. Karol, and Dessa Trevisan, Poland, Solidarity, Walesa (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1981), 39-40.
25
George, “1988 Polish Crisis,” 34.
26
Ibid.
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special health-care facilities.”27 Ash describes the group as “a client ruling class. Its
members enjoy power, status, and privileges (in varying degrees) by virtue simply of
belonging to it. They may not individually own the means of production, but they do
collectively control them.”28 The nomenklatura was very much separated from the
struggles of the working class men and women and eventually lost touch with most of the
realities of the county, as can be seen in their decisions and policies. One such decision
was to increase the price of food when citizens were already experiencing difficulty
attaining food, which will be shown later in this paper. This system of party loyalty
undermined the advancement of many qualified Poles into positions within the
government in addition to upper level positions in factories, industry, education, and
hospitals. In the words of Ash,
The Party controls not only the appointment of its own full-time officials, known
collectively as the apparat, but also all the most important appointments in almost
every walk of life: central and local government officials, managers in industry
and commerce, publishers, newspaper editors, senior army officers, judges, trades
union leaders, university rectors, headmasters, leaders of youth and women’s
organizations, bankers, fire brigade commanders… For this purpose, the Party’s
Central, regional and local committees maintain lists of positions, and of people
judges fit to fill them.29
These positions were not awarded to those who were most suited, best trained, or most
competent but instead to those who had the strongest connections to the PZPR. This left
many Polish citizens dissatisfied with their leadership and led to a loss of confidence for
a majority of Poles in the governmental system of promotion.30

27

Michael D Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-type
Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 295.
28
Ash, The Polish Revolution, 9.
29
Ibid., 8-9.
30
Michael D. Kennedy. “Polish Engineers’ Participation in the Solidarity Movement.” Social Forces 65,
no. 3 (Mar., 1987): 656.
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Building Up to Solidarity
Discussed in the previous section, the condition of life for most citizens in PostWorld War II Poland were less than acceptable and showed no signs on improving
despite many promises from the PZPR for future progress. The few beliefs and hopes
that Poles may have cultivated from the statements and propaganda of the PZPR began to
disappear as conditions in Poland year to year failed to improve. The people of Poland
eventually began to grow restless and became bolder in their statements, actions, and
defiance of the PZPR and USSR. The Solidarity movement fits into a long history of
worker and intellectual protests that took place in Post-World War II Poland. Strikes and
protests in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 all helped prepare the Polish citizenry for the
actions taken on August 14, 1980 in the Lenin Shipyards of Gdańsk that sparked the
Solidarity movement.31
On June 28, 1956, large protests were held in the western city of Poznan and the
event came to be known as the Poznan uprising.32 Workers at the Cegielski works (aka:
Stalin engineering works) took to the streets in protest of the poor wages and long hours
of work with signs proclaiming “Bread and Freedom”. In her book Solidarity’s Secret:
The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland, Shana Penn states that the workers
rushed the PZPR party headquarters in an attempt to have their voices heard and their
needs addressed. The Polish army was dispatched by the PZPR to put an end to the
demonstration, a task that took them two days to complete. Penn estimates nine hundred
people were injured and seventy-five were killed. Ash claims that hundreds were injured

31
32

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 42.
Ibid, 11.
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and at least fifty-three people were killed.33 This event was significant because it marked
the first time that the workers stood up in protest of the PZRP.
In 1968 it was the students turn to test the PZPR. Davies attributed the
student protest to the cancelation and censorship of a popular theatrical performance in
Warsaw. The play, titled Forefathers’ Eve, had been written in the 1830s by Adam
Mickiewicz and concerned the rebellion of Poles in opposition to the occupying forces of
the Russian Empire.34 The rebellion came to be known as the November Uprising. The
Polish crowd was savvy to all the subtle anti-Russian subject matter and, in defiance of
the Soviet Union, cheered loudly during appropriate moments. Eventually a Soviet
ambassador caught on to the anti-Soviet mood created in the theater and ordered future
performances of the play canceled. The censorship of a work by a prominent Polish
playwright in his own country proved to be more than the students of Warsaw could
tolerate and they took to the streets in protest. Students were beaten and arrested for
challenging the PZPR. Judt contends that the majority of the students and professors who
were arrested during this period were Jewish.35 These anti-Semitic actions introduced by
the conservative wing of the PZPR were aimed at clearing Jews from positions of
influence that could be used to criticize the PZPR. In the words of Judt, “Jews were now
invited to leave the country. Many did so, under humiliating conditions and at great
personal cost. Of Poland’s remaining 30,000 Jews some 20,000 departed in the course of
1968-69, leaving only a dew thousand behind mostly the elderly and the young.”36 This

33

Ash, The Polish Revolution,12.
Judt, Post War, 433.
35
Ibid., 434.
36
Judt, Post War, 435.
34
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event was significant because it marked the first time that the students stood up in protest
of the PZRP.
The next major protests came in 1970. In December 1970 close to Christmas the
PZPR announced a 20 percent increase in food prices.37 The news of the price increase
sparked a number of demonstrations and strikes thorough the country that eventually
prompted attacks on party headquarters and the looting of stores. In Gdańsk, workers
from the Lenin Shipyard numbering in the thousands marched to the local party
headquarters and demanded that the price increase be rescinded. Soldiers who had been
dispatched to pacify the crowds began applying force. Davies states “In Gdańsk, a train
bringing workers to the shipyards, where a lock-out had been proclaimed, was ambushed,
and fired on by armed militiamen.”38 Armored military vehicles crushed participants
taking part in demonstrations while soldiers shot others. In total around three hundred
people were killed.39 Among the casualties were military men, whose lives were claimed
by angry demonstrators. These conflicts between fellow Polish nationals were hard for
some Poles to justify and in the words of Ash “The shooting of their comrades in front of
the shipyard gates on Wednesday 16 December transgressed that especially sacred
unwritten commandment of the Polish religion of freedom ‘Pole shall not kill Pole”.40 A
notable number of Polish soldiers refused orders to fire upon their fellow country people.
The crisis brought about a change in the administration as the Communist Party leader
Władysław Gomułka stepped down and was replaced by Edward Gierek.41

37

Davies, God’s Playground, 590.
Ibid.
39
Ibid, 591.
40
Ash, The Polish Revolution, 14.
41
Davies, God’s Playground, 591.
38
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Again in 1976 the laborers of Poland showed their discontent with the PZPR.
Workers in the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw marched through the rail yards and
held up a passing train that was the vital Paris-Moscow express.42 In the southeastern
town of Radom workers set fire to the party headquarters after attempting to be heard by
the authorities.43 The actions of the workers were not without consequence and shortly
thereafter police and government-hired thugs came after the workers. Ash reveals
“police and security thugs moved in to take a savage revenge on the workers of Radom
and Ursus, forcing them to run the gauntlet through two lines of truncheon-wielding
police, who called this, with delicate irony, the ‘path of health’.”44 Those who were not
injured or killed were thrown in prison and faced court proceedings.
Out of these 1976 strikes, some intellectuals saw the need for proper
representation of the accused workers and formed the Workers Defense Committee
(KOR). Observing that the workers were mostly inept at defending themselves in the
courtrooms, the KOR sought to help and protect workers from the overreaching
accusations of the PZPR. The formation of the KOR was an important step towards a
unified worker and intellectual alliance that bridged a historical class divide. Previously
when either the workers or the intellectuals and students held protests, they asked the
other group to join in, but often with limited success. A successful movement that
unified workers and intellectuals was not achieved until the strikes of 1980, which began
as a workers movement but grew to include students and intellectuals, and eventually
other groups within Poland as well. Numerous issues that workers protested, such as
high food prices, long hours of work, and low wages, affected the intelligentsia as well,
42

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 19.
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
43
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which caused many within the intelligentsia to realize the value of a partnership.
Members of the KOR began to produce and publish critiques and condemnations of the
PZPR, which provided written justification of further demonstrations and strikes by
workers.45 Ash states, “There were two excellent uncensored literary magazines and
upwards of ten uncensored journals of opinion. The publisher Nowa or New, which was
the largest of the underground publishers, produced some hundred works, including a
Polish translation of Orwell’s Animal Farm and a pocket-sized handbook giving
instructions for dealing with the secret police.”46 Members of the intelligentsia also
began to organize “flying universities” (TKN) which were informal classroom sessions
held in apartments to provide a space for learning about polish history and thus
reinforcing the culture of resistance to the PZPR and USSR.47
These examples of strikes, uprisings, protests, and other actions present evidence
to the point that the Polish citizenry was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
economic conditions as well as the leadership of their country. Life in Poland during
post-World War II was a constant struggle for many Poles who endured food shortages,
lack of access to goods and services, and censorship under the governance of the PZPR.
Out of these difficult conditions a strong and unified voice of the Polish people would
soon emerge, declaring a strong desire for change.
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Early Days of Solidarity
On August 14, 1980, workers managed to sneak protest posters into in the Lenin
Shipyards of Gdańsk.48 The workers were, firstly, demanding the reinstatement of Anna
Walentynowicz, a former crane operator who had been fired for attempting to organize
the workers of the shipyard and speaking out against the management and, secondly, a
one thousand złoty increase in pay. As the work shift began the laborers left the locker
rooms and began to march though the shipyard, banners held high. The group proceeded
through the shipyard and called out to others to join them and workers dropped their
welders and other tools to join the crowd. The protest was gaining momentum.49
Once the group reached main gate number two, the gathering had swelled to over
a hundred participants.50 Once at the gate, factions within the crowd wanted to push on
and take the protest into the streets of Gdańsk. The workers began to debate what action
should be taken, with some workers expressing fear of leaving the shipyard, citing the
1970 demonstrations that resulted in the violent and bloody crackdown by the army. The
leaders of the 1980 protest called for a minute of silence to commemorate those who had
died during the December 1970 protests, which was followed by the singing of the
national anthem. The management of the shipyard began to make promises to the
workers in an attempt to pacify the crowd. As stated by Stanisław Starski in the book
Class Struggle in Classless Poland the management offered to consider rehiring
Walentynowicz and offered to work towards increasing the salaries of the worker.51 The
workers listened to the assurances that the management was willing to offer and the
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energy of the crowd along with the drive to continue the strike began to decline. It was at
this point that a mustachioed electrician who was a previous employee of the shipyard
arrived late to the protest and addressed the crowd.52
The mustachioed man was Lech Wałęsa and with a stirring speech from atop an
excavator at gate number two breathed new life into the strike. Wałęsa had a history of
union activity and organizing workers that brought upon much harassment by police and
factory management, eventually leading to his loss of his job at the shipyard. He had
been active in the 1970 strike and was now back for another round with the management
of the shipyard and the PZPR. A simple man who previous to the 1980 strike had never
traveled outside of Poland or read a book, Wałęsa embodied the persona of the common
proletariat of Poland who had grown up in the communist system.53 Addressing the
workers, Wałęsa warned them not the be fooled by the promises made by the
management who in the past had often stated plans to improve the situation of the
workers but rarely delivered any substantial changes. With this invigorating speech the
will of the workers to carry on the strike was reestablished and a sit-in was declared. The
final words of Wałęsa from his perch upon the excavator were “we organize herewith an
occupational strike”.54
With the declaration of the strike the limousine of the shipyard director was sent
to transport Anna Walentynowicz to the negotiations. Walentynowicz was well known
by the workers and she was received in a manner befitting a celebrity. She was a longstanding employee of the Lenin Shipyard and due to a lack of kin had found a sense of
belonging and family amongst her proletarian workers. Shortly after she was hired in
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1950, Walentynowicz become a well-known figure in the shipyard by winning a welding
competition based on speed and output that was hosted by the shipyard management.55
Walentynowicz had outperformed all the other women welders by working at 270 percent
the average pace.56 This event gave her bragging rights, respect, and fame. Penn shares
that Walentynowicz cared for her fellow workers though acts such as preparing hot soup
and milk and planting flowers on the factory grounds. Fellow shipyard workers warmly
called her “Mrs. Annie” and she used her popularity to stick up for the rights of the
workers and was not afraid to take issue with the management, which in turn earned her
more respect from workers. With Walentynowicz and Wałęsa both in the shipyard the
strike movement had two bona fide leaders who had earned the respect of the workers
and had the legitimacy to fight for their demands.57
The news of the strike slowly spread throughout Poland despite efforts by the
PZPR to conceal, downplay, or spin the events. The state-run media began to report on
the strike but added commentary that favored the PZPR and the factory management.
Starski reveals that while most of the workers may have read or watched the state-run
media, they were well aware that it was largely propaganda.58 The workers were staying
inside the factory, which provided them some measure of protection from the police or
hired thugs, but the PZPR and management had other tactics, aside from the media, that
they put to task in an attempt to break the strike. According to Starski crates of vodka
materialized at the factory gates in an attempt to distract the workers though drink and
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possibly encourage provocation of the police.59 The workers showed great restraint and
established a “workers guard” who were charged with keeping order in the shipyard.
Two main tasks of the “workers guard” were to keep alcohol out of the shipyard and to
regulate who could enter and exit the premises. By keeping a close watch on who was
admitted to the shipyard, the “workers guard” could minimize the possibility of police,
informants, or other trouble makers gaining access to the workers, gaining information,
or instigating a confrontation. A strike committee was soon formed to which Wałęsa was
appointed leader.60
Within a relatively short amount of time the workers of the Gdańsk shipyard
realized that their struggle against the management and the PZPR reached beyond the
walls of their institution and encompassed more than just the interests of the workers at a
single dockyard. A mentality of camaraderie and togetherness with all workers of Poland
soon developed among those striking in the shipyard. With this revelation the strike
committee became the Inter-Factory Strike Committee61 and workers from other regions,
trades, and factories were encouraged to participate as well. Workers from all over
Poland began to send representatives to relay support, embody concerns, and assist in
negotiations with the PZPR. The PZPR and MKS initiated daily negotiations that Polish
citizens and people around the world eagerly watched.62
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21 Demands of the MKS
Up to this point it is clear that the strike of Thursday, August 14, 1980, began
with humble demands that were localized and tied to the needs of workers employed at a
single factory. This soon began to change as the workers of the Lenin shipyard realized
that their struggle was that of all Polish workers. With a steadily increasing number of
participants and supporters, the goals of the strike began to grow as well and an expanded
and a list of 21 demands were drafted. This new declaration, that was completed by
Sunday evening August 17, sought to improve of living conditions, rights, and access to
services for all workers in Poland.63 With the clear statement of these goals the
movement began to shift from labor dispute to a national social movement. The
following is the list of the 21 demands of the MKS (Inter-Factory Strike Committee):
1. Acceptance of Free Trade Unions independent of both the Party and
employers, in accordance with the International Labor Organization's Convention
number 87 on the freedom to form unions, which was ratified by the Polish
government.
2. A guarantee of the right to strike and guarantees of security for strikers and
their supporters.
3. Compliance with the freedoms of press and publishing guaranteed in the Polish
constitution. A halt to repression of independent publications and access to the
mass media for representatives of all faiths.
4. (a) Reinstatement to their former positions for: people fired for defending
workers' rights, in particular those participating in the strikes of 1970 and 1976;
students dismissed from school for their convictions. (b) The release of all
political prisoners...(c) A halt to repression for one's convictions.
5. The broadcasting on the mass media of information about the establishment of
the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) and publication of the list of demands.
6. The undertaking of real measures to get the country out of its present crisis by:
(a) providing comprehensive, public information about the socio-economic
situation; (b) making it possible for people from every social class and stratum of
society to participate in open discussions concerning the reform program.
7. Compensation of all workers taking part in the strike for its duration with
holiday pay from the Central Council of Trade Unions.
8. Raise the base pay of every worker 2,000 zlotys per month to compensate for
price rises to date.
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9. Guaranteed automatic pay raises indexed to price inflation and to decline in
real income.
10. Meeting the requirements of the domestic market for food products: only
surplus goods to be exported.
11. The rationing of meat and meat products through food coupons (until the
market is stabilized).
12. Abolition of "commercial prices" and hard currency sales in so-called
"internal export" shops.
13. A system of merit selection for management positions on the basis of
qualifications rather than Party membership. Abolition of the privileged status of
MO [police], SB [Internal Security Police], and the party apparatus through:
equalizing all family subsidies; eliminating special stores, etc.
14. Reduction of retirement age for women to 50 and for men to 55. Anyone who
has worked in the PRL [Polish People's Republic] for 30 years, for women, or 35
years for men, without regard to age, should be entitled to retirement benefits.
15. Bringing pensions and retirement benefits of the "old portfolio" to the level of
those paid currently.
16. Improvement in the working conditions of the Health Service, which would
assure full medical care to working people.
17. Provision for sufficient openings in daycare nurseries and preschools for the
children of working people.
18. Establishment of three-year paid maternity leaves for the raising of children.
19. Reduce the waiting time for apartments.
20. Raise per diem [for work-related travel] from 40 zlotys to 100 zlotys and
provide cost-of-living increases.
21. Saturdays to be days off from work. Those who work on round-the-clock jobs
or three-shift systems should have the lack of free Saturdays compensated by
increased holiday leaves or through other paid holidays off from work.64
As can be seen, these are a very basic set of rights, assurances, and benefits that all
people of Poland desired. The right to healthcare, time off work, a living wage,
childcare, and education, it is safe to say, are universally desired circumstances in which
a citizen can lead a safe, secure, productive, and satisfactory life. The workers of Poland
felt that they were working and living in a system that was not compatible with the lives
they desired to live. The workers of the MKS envisioned a free and open society where
all Poles, no matter their job or class, could have access to basic rights and benefits, while
having an equal voice in the politics and direction of the country.
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With official recognition from the PZPR on Sunday August 31, 1980, the MKS
won the right to establish a trade union independent from the government system of the
PZPR. With this acknowledgement, the PZPR gave up its monopoly on power and
authority as the sole legitimate political party in the nation of Poland. Although the
independent trade unions initially were not established to be political parties, and their
members asked only for the right to control issues directly dealing with certain industries,
this concession created a secondary organization outside of the PZPR that the party
would have to negotiate with. This new arrangement would provide an outlet for descent
and criticism that the party previously would not acknowledge. The PZPR previously
had kept discussions and debates about policies, decisions, and other governmental
matters hidden from public view and only informing the citizenry after a decision had
been reached.65
Shortly thereafter, on Wednesday September 17, 1980, a group of thirty-five
aspiring independent trade unions from throughout Poland met in Hotel Morski in
Gdańsk to discuss future plans and actions. The group formally adopted the name
Solidarność66 as the title of the consolidated trade union that would represent the
movement that had grown to include three million workers at 3,500 Polish factories.67
Lech Wałęsa was elected to the position of Chairman of the union.68
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Expansion of Solidarity
Other groups from differing job sectors, classes, and regions in Poland began to
take notice of the actions and ambitions of the shipyard and factory workers. The
farmers in Rzeszów, Poland, organized and began what came to be known as Rural
Solidarity. Students organized and formed the Independent Student Union.69 Journalists,
writers, filmmakers, historians, doctors, engineers, architects, economists, and other
groups began to organize in a similar fashion as well. Ash jokingly states, “If there had
been a Polish association of belly dancers they would certainly have held an
extraordinary meeting, demanding changes in their statutes, less Party interference in the
sport, more truth in the reporting of it…”70 The whole of Poland became more vocal in
sharing their critiques on topics ranging from the PZPR, to the economy, to political
issues, and so on. All of Poland came together and began to share ideas of what changes
they would like to see in the future direction of their country. Due to the oppressive,
authoritarian, and overbearing climate created and maintained by the PZPR in PostWWII Poland, open dialogue of this nature was unprecedented.71

Declaration of Martial Law
The excitement brought about through the anticipation of change and progress
resonated throughout Poland. Solidarity had blanketed the country and as highlighted by
Ash, “Poles joked that Lwów and Wilno (now inside the Soviet Union) were the only
Polish cities not in revolt.”72 As the people became emboldened and stimulated by
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discussion of new ideas and possibilities for the future of the country, the propaganda of
the PZPR began to loose its effect on the majority of Poles. While this period of time may
have been an exciting and stirring time for Polish citizens, members of the PZPR were
quickly realizing their vulnerability and exposure.
Likely concerned that the nation of Poland would descend into chaos, the PZPR
through the Council of the State declared martial law on December 13, 1981, in
accordance with the constitution of Poland.73 Under the orders of General Wojciech
Jaruzelski the Polish army took over the country. Ash writes of the first day of martial
law, “Troops set up roadblocks between major cities. Civilian telephone and telex lines
were cut everywhere. Radio and television stations were taken over. Within hours,
Poland was partitioned and blockaded, internally and externally sealed off.”74 This early
morning assault on the Polish people was a tactic to instill fear and doubt in the Polish
population, in addition to reinforcing the rule of the PZPR. Marital law brought chaos
and panic as citizens were beaten by troops, people were killed, around 10,000 Solidarity
leaders were arrested, illegal printing operations were shut down, and homes were
ransacked.75
General Jaruzelski addressed the nation by television and explained martial law
had been declared in response to an alleged plot to overthrow the communist government
by the leaders of Solidarity. Jaruzelski stated that law and order was the main objective
of martial law and that Poland was “on the brink of the abyss.”76 While the state-run
media proclaimed there was indeed a plot against the government, Ash finds little
73
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evidence to support the accusation made by Jaruzelski of a planned coup d'état.77 Ash
compares martial law to Poland’s World War II history with the statement, “General
Jaruzelski’s two-week Blitzkrieg in December 1981 was to Solidarity what the threeweek Blitzkrieg of September 1939 was to the Second Republic.”78 While Jaruzelski may
have stated his reasoning for martial law was to protect the Polish people, most Poles
likely felt that the action was taken to protect the status quo and the PZPR.
This desperate, bold, and unprecedented move on behalf of the PZPR to remain in
power and control caused some loss in momentum for Solidarity, and the movement was
forced underground. Martial law brought about the arrests of major Solidarity leaders
and made communication between individuals and groups much more difficult.
Solidarity, which had enjoyed freedom to organize, strike, and protest for nearly a year
and a half was now being challenged with force. While these setbacks provided new
challenges for Solidarity, its members were not dissuaded or discouraged and continued
to protest and resist the PZPR.79

Round Table Talks
Between 1981 and 1989 Solidarity maintained an underground resistance to the
PZPR though illegal publications, underground meetings, and occasional protests. The
ability of the PZPR to keep the Solidarity movement from challenging its monopoly on
power and authority finally subsided with the Round Table talks that took place from
February 6 through April 5, 1989.80 The talks brought together representatives from the
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government, the democratic opposition (mostly Solidarity members), the Polish
Communist Party, and the Roman Catholic Church.81 The meeting took place in Warsaw
and involved four hundred fifty-two representatives. The discussion was primarily
concerning how to fix Poland’s dysfunctional political and economic institutions.
According to the article “Reflections on 1989: When Poland’s future opened up,
Solidarity’s sense of Agency Disappeared,” David Ost cites the 1988 wildcat strikes by
Polish the coal miners as one force that ushered the PZPR back to the negotiating table.
On May 4, 1988, the Polish union of 460,000 coal miners declared a “collective dispute
with the government”.82 The following day special troops of the Polish Interior Ministry
were dispatched to deal with the striking workers and put to use tear gas and percussion
grenades as well as physical force. Konstantin George in his article states that 19
members of the strike committee were arrested.83 These strikes showed a resolute
workforce that was still dissatisfied with the economics of Poland and the PZPR.
In the words of Ost the wildcat strikes brought about “Round Table negotiations,
elections, and the a new government.”84 The Round Table Agreement brought about free
elections where Solidarity leaders could run against PZPR party officials in direct
competition for government offices. This move was an acknowledgement of an
alternative power structure outside of the PZPR and gave a final legitimacy to Solidarity
as a political force.
Out of the round table talks came certain agreements and actions including the
creation of and upper-house or Senat consisting of 100 seats, the creation of a
81
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Presidential office, and an agreement to hold election for the 460 seats in a the lower
house of parliament or Sejm.85 The elections for the 35 percent of the Sejm positions
were open to a “free vote” proved to be a smashing success for the Solidarity movement
as Solidarity took all of the available posts that were up for vote. In her book The Shock
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Naomi Klein states, “The results were
humiliating for the Communists and glorious for Solidarity: of the 261 seats in which
Solidarity ran candidates, it won 260 of them.”86 This blow-out victory for Solidarity is
proof that few Polish voters were supporting the PZPR, and when presented with an
alternative to the PZPR party the Polish people overwhelmingly voted for the opposition,
Solidarity. Solidarity had completed a journey starting from a humble labor organization,
to a recognized trade union, to a social movement involving a large portion of the Polish
population, and ultimately arriving at direct governmental representation. With this
victory Solidarity moved into the realm of politics and was finally on near equal footing
with the PZPR.
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CHAPTER 3
WOMEN OF THE SOLIDARITY MOVMENT

When Solidarity first became recognized as a trade union on August 31, 1980, it
is estimated that women accounted for fifty percent of its members.1 Women were
attracted to the Solidarity movement because it advocated for shorter work hours, a lower
retirement age, and better pay, which were interests that affected men and women
equally. Issues that were essentially associated with the female role in Poland, such as
childcare, maternity leave, and schooling, also attracted women.2 This meant that female
Solidarity members felt comfortable supporting a movement they believed addressed
women’s issues.
In the 1980s Poland some professions had a higher representation of
women than others. In the book Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A
Critical Sociology of Societ-type Society, Michael Kennedy highlights the story of a
female medical worker who was involved with the Solidarity Movement. Medical
professionals were given more autonomy than other professionals in Poland and women
were well represented in the field.3 According to Kennedy, “more women played a
leading role in the Solidarity medical section than in any other branch of the movement.”4
Medical professionals were granted power and privileges by their position, but these
benefits were awarded by the PZPR, so party loyalty was expected for maintaining a
position. Because medical professionals were under surveillance by the PZPR, it was
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risky to associate closely with Solidarity or to speak out against the party on the ground
that violating the party’s interests could cost them their employment.5
The medical worker mentioned above, who wished to remain anonymous, was on
the Church Heath Commission in Warsaw and belonged to a team of physicians who
wanted to visit a prison in Kwidzyn where twenty political prisoners allegedly had been
beaten.6 The authorities denied the team access to the prison, but they soon learned that
some of the severely injured prisoners had been sent to a hospital near by.7 In the words
of Kennedy, “She went to the hospital on her own and not as a member of the
commission, and subsequently published findings on these prisoners. In response to her
activities, the authorities closed down her ninety-bed ward in a regional hospital. Shortly
after, they reopened the ward and invited her staff, but not her, to return.”8 The staff of
ten physicians who previously worked under her refused to go back to work and started a
petition for her reinstatement that eventually gathered the names of 1,000 medical
professionals.9 Unfortunately the support of her collogues was not enough to sway the
PZPR and she was officially black listed and therefore denied employment in her
profession.
This story of this female medical professional shares a similar arch to the story of
Walentynowicz. Both women were pushing back against a system that they believed to
be corrupt, authoritarian, and oppressive and lost their jobs for speaking out. Citizens
expressing their discontent eventually overwhelmed the PZPR, but to be singled out by
the party was likely unnerving.
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Women who were involved with the Solidarity movement played a vital role
throughout the history of the movement but especially during martial law. As was
mentioned earlier, when martial law was declared many of the Solidarity leaders were
imprisoned. Penn notes that of the ten thousand activists that were arrested, one thousand
were women and nine thousand were men.10 With many of the male Solidarity leaders
detained, a group of women were able to carry on the movement through the publication
of the underground Solidarity newspaper Tygodnik Mazowsze.11 Penn shows that the
women had distinct advantage over men operating in Solidarity while it was underground
with the statement, “Blinded by sexism, the secret police hunted diligently for the men
they assumed to be behind the newspaper-Solidarity men in hiding whose names had
appeared in bylines.”12 The Solidarity movement managed to stay one step ahead of the
PZPR, secret police, and military by relying on an all-female leadership to organize and
publish Tygodnik Mazowsze and to keep the ethos of Solidarity alive.
The influential group of women that produced Tygodnik Mazowsze was the
Damska Grupa Operacyjna (DGO) or Ladies’ Operations Unit, a group that formed after
the declaration of martial law.13 The DGO consisted of seven women, Helena Łuczywo,
Anna Dodziuk, Anna Bikont, Małgorzata Pawlicka, Zofia Bydlińska, Ewa Kulik, and
Joanna Szczęsna.14 These women worked long hours in stressful conditions to produce
Tygodnik Mazowsze, which helped to spread vital news and kept the Polish people
connected and united during the difficult time of martial law. In reference to the
difficulties of producing Tygodnik Mazowsze for the nation of Poland Penn states, “This
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mammoth enterprise was carried out in people’s homes, in basements and attics, in
churches, and in cars- in other words Helena and her compatriots pulled it off without the
use of real offices.”15
The news operation was always on the move in order to avoid being detected by
the authorities and thus all printing supplies, documents, and equipment were constantly
being secretly shuffled from one location to another.16 Penn reveals the day-to-day
activates of the DGO that were required to produce Tygodnik Mazowsze, “To build an
information network-primitive, covert, low-tech the organizers needed living quarters,
workspaces, printing equipment, and transportation. They needed names and addresses,
false identification cards, and lots of cold cash. Also high on their list were costumes,
cosmetics, and props to build a wardrobe of disguises.”17 The DGO was always looking
for fellow Poles who could become involved with Tygodnik Mazowsze, and it was
important to network and include a wide range of people with differing skills. The
involvement of Helena Łuczywo in the underground press proved to be good training and
she went on to become one of the most successful and well paid women in Poland. Her
success stemmed from the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza (Election Gazette) that she
helped to found in 1989, which eventually grew into a media empire.18
In her article “Women’s Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil,
East Germany, and Poland,” Lisa Baldez provides the argument that average Poles
associated feminism in the 1970s with PZPR party members.19 Baldez states, “Poles
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traveled abroad frequently in the 1970s, making ‘four million trips to Western cities
during the decade, but the state restricted international traveling privileges to party
loyalists. For dissidents direct contact with the western world remained limited. These
and other privileges extended to party elites bred deep antipathy among ordinary Polesand contempt for the ideas they brought back with them from abroad.”20 Thus, members
of a ruling party that were viewed with much suspicion by ordinary Poles introduced the
feminist movement into Polish society. Baldez provides more evidence citing a 1981
Women’s League conference, “The slogans that party leaders intoned at this meeting
echo the concerns of western feminists and suggest that Polish party officials were
influenced by international events such as the United Nations’ Women’s Conferences.
These slogans included: ‘The corset with which they once laced us keeps disabling us,’
‘Why are we so weak and helpless?,’ and ‘Democracy is impossible without women’s
involvement.’ It is little wonder that Polish women were skeptical of groups whose
views elided so neatly with those of party officials.”21
Baldez argues that women did not seek to organize outside of the Solidarity
movement because a majority of women felt that the moment effectively included their
concerns and issues.22 She points towards some of the changes fought for and eventually
awarded to the Interfactory Strike committee as, “A three year paid maternity leave,
guaranteed day care slots for working women, and, for nurses, higher wages and
housing,” as having special relevance to women.23 While this was enough to satisfy
many Polish women, some began to organize outside of the movement in an attempt to
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raise awareness of the lack of female leadership in Solidarity. Baldez credits a series of
seminars conducted by Renata Siemienska in the late 1970s at the University of Warsaw
for inspiring the creation of The Polish Feminist Association.24 The Polish Feminist
Association along with other similar groups in Poland were pushed underground during
martial law but years later came roaring back in response to an antiabortion legislation
proposed in the Sejm in 1989.25
Today in Poland some women are still seeking increased representation from a
political system that they view as not meeting their needs or interests. Some women see
inequalities in the political and civil institutions of Poland. In the article “Hostages of
Destiny: Gender Issues in Today’s Poland” Monika Platek raises the issue of unequal
female representation in Polish politics with the passage, “The elections (1998) showed
that, although women in Poland constitute the majority of the population (51.4%), their
participation in local authorities is small, even though there are now more women on
many Councils; in big towns particularly there are more now than there were five years
ago.”26 While Platek feels hopeful about the gradual progress of women in Poland, Beyer
feels that there are still obstacles to women’s equality, and he states, “When the issue of
gender parity in politics is raised in Poland, it is summarily dismissed by remarking on
the few women who have made it to the top; or that in ‘free’ elections, quotas should not
be used; or by recalling that a woman’s place is in the home, not in the ‘dirty’ world of
politics.”27
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CHAPTER 4
SOLIDARITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Throughout the Solidarity Movements rise to power, the Roman Catholic Church
played an integral role in the incubation and organization of the movement. The church
in Poland provided a space for shelter and open discourse, which was scarce and risky in
a society that was constantly under surveillance by the PZPR. The church proved to be a
safe place to gather and discuss alternative points of views or criticisms on topics such as
the economy, government, and politics.
The very act of embracing Catholicism was in itself a rejection of MarxismLeninism and the Soviet system, which was based on atheism and envisioned the
abolishment of religion. In the words of philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, “Today it is
clear that Catholicism in Poland should be acknowledged as the main factor during the
entire postwar period that led to a society and country that could not be ‘Sovietized.’
Even if Catholicism can be criticized on a philosophical or intellectual level, it was the
most important aspect of the resistance to the Sovietization of Poland. It was decisive.”1
The people of Poland were fortunate to have an institution such as the Roman Catholic
Church to help balance out the uneven distribution of power during its communist era.
While the Roman Catholic Church was nowhere near as powerful as the PZPR in areas
such as the government or economy, the church remained highly influential in Polish
culture.
Poland was unique in comparison with other Eastern European Soviet states
because a strong and well-organized religious presence existed within its borders. This
1
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provided an alternative power structure to that of the state. Because the Roman Catholic
Church was not a political party or government organization, the PZPR was not directly
challenged for control of the country, but the church and its members were able to make
critical statements and appeals for change.2 One such member was Solidarity Chaplin
and philosopher Father Józef Tischner.3 Tischner was instrumental in managing disputes
within the Solidarity movement among members and negotiating on behalf of Solidarity,
with the PZPR.4
When Pope John Paul II visited Poland in June 1979, the Polish people received
him with open arms.5 John Paul II, a native of Poland, connected easily with the Polish
people as he traveled throughout the country addressing crowds of eager Poles. During
one of his public addresses the pope stated, “the future of Poland will depend on how
many people are mature enough to be nonconformists.”6 Ash portrays the visit as
spurring a renewal and recharging of Catholicism in Poland and creating an ever-stronger
commitment to the religion. The words of John Paul II helped to encourage Poles of all
ages to pursue the faith in addition to challenging the communist system.7
A little over a year after Pope John Paul II visited Poland, Catholic mass was
being held inside the shipyard during the first days of the strike in Gdańsk. On Sunday
August 17, three days after the beginning of the strike, an altar was erected near gate
number two and according to Ash, “the blue grey gates were adorned with flowers and a
large, frame color photograph of the pope.”8 Father Jankowski addressed the workers on
2
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a loudspeaker system and presented a handmade wooden cross. The religious ceremony
helped to unite and inspire workers to continue to oppose the PZPR and carry on the
strike.9
Although the Roman Catholic Church may have supported the Solidarity
movement, some Catholics are skeptical of the involvement of the church in the political
and economic affairs of a nation. In the article “Catholic Social Thought and Socioeconomic and Political Transformation in Poland,” Gedymin Spychalski states, “the
church does not intend to forcefully impose one socio-economic model or system over
another. Nor can it directly solve the complexities of socio-economic life. What it can
do is follow its religious and moral mission by putting forth the various philosophies and
suggesting ways to bring them close to each other in the name of Christian principals.”10
In this model, the Roman Catholic Church should not get too involved with the details of
the economy or politics but instead just offer general recommendations and commentary
to government officials. In May 2006, Pope Benedict XVI backed up this viewpoint
during an address he made to a crowd at St. John’s Cathedral in Warsaw: “The priest is
not asked to be an expert in economics, construction or politics. He is expected to be an
expert in spiritual life.”11 The vision stated by Pope Benedict advocates for the ability of
Catholic leaders to make criticisms of economic and political systems but also allow
these systems to regulate and change on their own.
Some Poles believe that church leadership should be more involved in economic
issues of Poland. One example from Beyer states, “The Tischner European School of
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Higher Education in Cracow and the National Back of Poland co-sponsored seminars in
economics and business management for priests. These two organizations assumed that
priests in Poland today should have some facility in these fields in order to grapple with
important contemporary pastoral and social problems. However, the clergy showed little
interest, and many priests think that economic issues are not relevant to their work.”12
This passage shows that debate continues on the involvement of Catholic priests with the
economics of Poland.
Although the Roman Catholic Church may have helped the Solidarity movement
and aided in the downfall of the PZPR and communism in Poland, some Poles are
concerned about the role of the church in the political affairs of the country today.
Without the strong opponent of communism the Roman Catholic Church has more power
and influence than it has had in the past. Catholicism is vastly more popular than any
other religion in Poland, but some Poles are still reluctant to allow the Roman Catholic
Church unchallenged access and influence over secular life.13 Beyer cites a poll that
states “from 1989 to 1995 the approval of the churches role in public life fell from
slightly above 90 percent to about 50 percent.”14 This statistic shows that a growing
number of Polish nationals wish to maintain a separation of the Roman Catholic Church
and secular Polish society.
While the Roman Catholic Church is one large united religious organization,
differing opinions and viewpoints exist within the institution. One conservative group
associated with the Catholic Church is the Polish media group Radio Maryja. This rightwing Roman Catholic Radio Station was founded by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk in 1991 and
12
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is based in Toruń, Poland.15 In the article “Voice of the Disinherited? Religious Media
After the 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Poland,” Stanisław Burdziej
describes the connections of Radio Maryja with the politics of Poland. The station was
the center of much debate as some of the views expressed on the network were allegedly
anti-Semitic and anti-gay. The Vatican does not always endorse opinions expressed on
its radio and TV channels. The statement by Pope Benedict XVI that I referenced earlier
concerning priests keeping some distance from politics was seen by many as a direct
challenge to those involved with Radio Maryja.16
Radio Maryja has a reputation for being popular among unemployed, low-skilled,
elderly Poles. Burdziej cautions that this description may not provide an accurate profile
of all who enjoy the stations programming. He does admit that the station’s programing
seems to be designed with an older audience in mind. Burdziej states, “The Radio does
not emit commercial ads (although religious material is continuously advertised) and it is
its talking formula, together with peaceful music and lack of aggressive ads that may be
most attractive for many listeners, including the elderly and the sick.”17 Burdziej goes on
to state that the station ranks fifth most popular radio station in Poland, its listeners are
much more dedicated to the station, and are often encouraged to participate in activities
such as pilgrimages, petition signing, demonstrations, and lobbying politicians.18 This
makes the listeners of Rado Maryja a tighter group that is more organized than listeners
of other stations in Poland.
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Radio Maryja is involved in the politics of Poland and the station has a distinct
point of view and agenda. Those who listen to the station are likely to agree with the
views and opinions expressed on the station. Some of the more controversial statements
aired on the station include negative remarks about Jewish people, homosexuality,
liberals, the European Union, privatization of state owned companies, Germany, liberal
bishops, and opposition politicians. One sub-group within the conservative Roman
Catholic Church is the moherowe berety or mohair berets. This whimsical title is used to
describe older women who are dedicated listeners to Radio Maryja in a borderline
militant way. It is likely that individuals and groups identifying with Radio Maryja may
have unique opinions about the Solidarity movement that fall outside the mainstream
Polish culture.19
As can been seen, the Roman Catholic Church is very popular and powerful in
Poland today. The religion includes many members with differing views and objectives.
The protection and organization that the Roman Catholic Church provided for the
Solidarity movement was crucial to its success, but some scholars have questioned the
church leadership for becoming too closely involved in the secular institutions of the
country. Some Poles may debate what role the Catholic Church should play in the
political, social, and economic life of Poland today.
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CHAPTER 5
POLAND IN TRANSISTION: COMMUNISM TO CAPITALISM

Thus far, evidence has been provided to show that the majority of Polish citizens
were not satisfied with the PZPR or the communist system that had been imposed upon
them by the USSR. They were ready for a change in leadership and direction. The
Solidarity Movement did not propose a specific economic plan or societal arrangement
but instead a list of general improvements and betterments consistent with the twenty-one
demands of the MKS. The majority of Poles wanted a free and open society with less
centralized control and bureaucracy. What is unique about Solidarity was that the people
asked for these benefits for the whole of Polish society, not just for select classes,
regions, or groups. In this sense Solidarity transcended the interests of individuals and
focused on finding a way to improve the conditions of all Polish people. The people of
Poland had seen enough of the economic, social, and political system that the USSR had
put in place and looked expectantly towards the future of what a new Poland could
potentially be. With the goal of heading in new direction the new leadership of Poland
looked to the West for guidance and advice in an attempt to break with the policies and
ideology of the USSR.1
In the 1990s Poland began moving away from the communism of MarxismLeninism and towards Western style market capitalism, or stated in other terms from the
collective to the private. Western governments, investors, economists, and entrepreneurs
were eager to lend a hand in the process of remodeling the Polish economy. While these
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groups no doubt wanted to help the Polish people, the motives of these individuals and
groups has been the topic of much debate.
With the free elections of 1989 came the immergence of the Balcerowicz Plan
that eventually overshadowed other economic plans for reforming the Polish economic
system. The Balcerowicz plan proposed a rapid “jump” into market capitalism to make
the transition as fast as possible.2 Jeffery Sachs, a young American economist who had
established a reputation for his work on an economic stabilization plan for Bolivia,
endorsed the Balcerowicz Plan.3 According to Klein, Hungarian-American financier,
currency trader, and billionaire, George Soros backed Sachs and paid for him and his
assistant David Lipton to travel to Poland multiple times during the Round Table Talks.4
The Balcerowicz Plan was designed to primarily to disjoin Poland from its
Communist past. In his book Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy, Jeffery Sachs
refers to the goal of the Balcerowicz plan: “The goal was to create an economy ‘in the
style of Western Europe,’ based on private ownership, free markets, and integration into
world markets. The plan also combined long-term market reform with a short-run
emergency stabilization program to end the incipient hyperinflation.”5 The plan was not
restricted only to stabilization of the Polish economy, because there were also goals of
economic liberalization, privatization, construction of a “social safety net”, and mobilize
international financial assistance.6 The goals set by the Balcerowicz Plan were ambitious
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and charted a dramatic departure from the economic and social history of Communist
Poland.
With the exchange of Soviet-style communism for market capitalism some argue
that the form of “looting” or exploitation shifted from the USSR to the West. Eager
investors from Western Europe, Great Brittan, and the United States made their way to
Poland in hopes of making a profit in the recently stabilized, newly formed market.
Konstantin George states,
The looting by Western financial interests of Poland has been massive. Over the
past two years, Poland had paid nearly $11 billion in interest payments on
outstanding debt, “receiving” in return a mere $3 billion in “new” credits to roll
over existing debt repayment on principal. Despite this net outflow of $8 billion
from Poland to the West, Poland’s net debt to Western creditors climbed, in the
last year alone, from $34 billion to $39 billion.7
George’s comment goes to the point that helping Poland to a market economy was not
only a matter of philanthropy but also a business venture.
For all its failings the communist system provided jobs to all who were able to
work. While employment in communist Poland did not necessarily translate to
improvements in living conditions, it did aim to provide a minimal standard for all and
according to Beyer “extreme poverty was relatively rare”.8 In his book, From Solidarity
to Sellout: The Restoration of Capitalism in Poland, Tadeusz Kowalik states that,
“Unemployment was to be transitional and limited to 400,000 persons. Meanwhile, in
the first year it rose from nearly zero to over one million, in the second year to over two
million, in the their year it drew close to three million.”9
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According to philosopher Karl Marx, one of the conditions of capitalism is to
maintain a large pool of unemployed workers, which he referred to, as the Industrial
Reserve Army of the Unemployed that capitalists can use at will.10 If employment is at
100 percent of a set population, then employers have no leverage to pursue lower wages,
benefits, or work days. It is only though competition for jobs and work by employees
that an employer is able to wield the threat of layoffs or unemployment to drive down
benefits or wages. Therefore, according to a Marxist critique, unemployment is a
necessary reality for the capitalist system.11
While it can be said that the transition from communism to capitalism brought
wealth and prosperity for many Poles, there were also those who were left behind in the
transition. Poles living in rural areas were disproportionately more likely to have
struggled with the transition to capitalism than those living in urban areas. A lifestyle
and economic arrangement that had been learned and relied upon by many Polish citizens
was quickly switched out for a new system that was foreign to those who had been raised
under the Soviet capitalist system. Beyer uses the term homo sovieticus to identify
individuals who grew up during the age of Soviet style communism and had internalized
the rules and mentality of the system.12 Beyer states, “the character traits of homo
sovieticus are: eagerness to blame others and not one’s self, extreme suspicion of others
and their motives, fatalistic attitude towards life, a sense of entitlement, helplessness, and
irresponsibility.”13 These qualities and mentalities of that were cultivated by Polish
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citizens during the conditions of communism were antithetical to success in the new
capitalist system.
Beyer identifies one group that was disproportionately affected by the switch to
capitalism as those employed by the state-operated collectivized farms (PGR-y). These
farms were formed by the Polish government by attracting uneducated, poor citizens
from all over Poland with the promise of work, free housing, a small amount of land,
transportation, vacation time, preschool for children, and daycare.14 The PGR-y offered
poor citizens a basic level of goods and services as well as a measure of stability that
could not have been achieved elsewhere. Beyer shares that these communities were
isolated and removed from mainstream Polish culture, which worked against the PGR-y
farmers and their families when they were forced to integrate back into society in 1989.15
Both the integration and navigation of the recently adopted capitalist system was
challenging to many rural Poles. While those living in cities likely had some problems
shifting to the new capitalist system, PGR-y farmers and other rural Poles had more
problems with the new changes.
The balance of the collective needs versus individual pursuit of profit is a balance
that all societies deal with. At what level should the state apparatus intervene and referee
the market place on behalf of the citizens or in the support of business? A neo-liberal
viewpoint argues that the lessening of governmental oversight over markets and
businesses is best for society, while the perspectives of communism and socialism
suggest that businesses and markets should be regulated and planned to some degree for
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the wellbeing of all citizens.16 The nomenklatura in Communist Poland were in charge
of all decisions for the country including those regarding the economy and industry. This
centrally planned economy was in theory designed to benefit the citizens of Poland but in
practice fell short of its goals. In the article “Poland in 1989: Enter Tadeusz Mazowiecki
and the Creation of the Balcerowicz Plan,” Richard J. Hunter identifies the “four grand
failures” of the centrally planned economy in Poland (in addition to other Sovietcontrolled Eastern European countries) as:

1.
2.
3.

4.

Failure to create economic value or to improve the standard of living for
the average Pole.
Failure to provide adequate individual and organizational incentives
Failure to “measure up” to comparative economies, not only those
advanced capitalist economies in the West, bit also several “fraternal”
socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe (most notably
Hungary and Czechoslovakia – later the Czech Republic – and
Slovenia)
Failure to satisfy consumer needs, essentially creating and unofficial
dollarization of efficient “black market,” and the existence of “dollar”
stores and shops such as the ubiquitous PEWEX17 shops. 18

These failures left the people of Poland desiring another political system that would less
authoritarian, de-centralized, and democratic.
Numerous scholars have attempted to reconcile the position of the Roman
Catholic Church and various economic systems ranging from communism, to socialism,
to Capitalism. Mathematician and economist Angus Sibley argues in his article, “The
Cult of Capitalism: Hayek, Novak & the Limits of Laissez Faire,” that free markets and
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limited government intervention are not compatible with Catholic teachings. Sibley cites
the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et spes19 (Joy and Hope) as stating “political
authority… must always be exercised within the limits of the moral order and dedicated
towards the common good… The complex circumstances of our day make it necessary
for the public authority to intervene more often in social, economic, and cultural
matters.”20 As can be seen, the council is making a clear statement against allowing
markets and business to dictate the circumstances of civil society. Government
institutions must regulate a balance between the needs of society and the needs of the
markets. Sibley sums up the position of Hayek and libertarians as an “obsession with
shrinking the state-with privatization, deregulation, and low taxes.”21 This neo-liberal
vision moves the means of production away from government into the hands of
individuals.22 In addition to putting all business and industry into private control, neoliberalism also calls for less government intervention and regulation in the market
place.23 As can be seen, the policies of neo-liberalism differ greatly from socialism or
communism that outline economic systems where group ownership or state ownership is
the norm.24
Sibley shows that some free trade, laissez-faire enthusiasts believe that the
movements of free and unregulated markets are what God intended or divinely designed.
These views clash with views held by the Roman Catholic Church and proponents of
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economic justice or redistribution of wealth between those with plenty and those without.
He sites John Paul II’s Centesimus annus25 (Hundredth year) of 1991 on “the risk of
‘idolatry’ of the market” and goes on to state the words of the Pope as, “there are
collective and qualitative needs that cannot be satisfied by market mechanisms.”26 This
passage seems to be in direct opposition to those who wish to see the free market as
divinely inspired and claim to see God in the “invisible hand” of market transactions.
Sibley believes that the free market arrangements that economist Friedrich Hayek
proposes were responsible for “income inequalities in the United States that revert to
levels not seen since the 1920s…”27 The policies of Hayek strongly favor those who
possess capital and do little to address the needs of those without. Sibley also takes issue
with the proposition of Ludwig Von Mises, an Austrian born economist. According to
Mises, free market capitalism is a fair and democratic system where money being spent is
a type of “vote”. In the words of Mises, “the capitalist system is a democracy in which
every penny represents a ballot paper.” 28 One criticism that Sibley raises with the theory
proposed by Mises is that those possessing more money have increased purchasing power
and therefor more influence in a system where money spent functions as a type of “vote”.
In a true democracy each person is granted one vote and thus, in Mises’s theory, the free
market system fails to satisfy the equality of citizens that is required of a true democracy.
Sibley evokes the Second Vatican council’s Dignitatis humanae29 (Of the Dignity
of the Human Person) as tying freedom to the pursuit of what is virtuous or good, and
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proceeds to show that Hayek is hesitant to acknowledge this link.30 This Catholic
document makes the point that freedom is not just the lack of coercion and constraint
allowing people to do whatever they desire but freedom is the situation where individuals
are able to pursue the good without impediment.31 It appears that Hayek is interested in a
freedom that places little to no responsibility for effects of an individual’s action outside
of the legal requirements necessary to protect a functioning free market. The freedom
envisioned by Hayek promotes minimal moral or ethical claims and expects the market to
regulate and guide the decisions and behavior of entrepreneurs and business people.32
This dispute over which economic philosophy is most beneficial for all citizens
ties into the legacy of the Solidarity movement through Poland’s shift from Communism
to Capitalism. Poland shifted from a system that was ideally designed and instituted for
the common good (but became corrupt and fell short of its goals) to a system that
encourages competition and struggle for goods and services. While capitalism can range
in levels of regulation and government oversight from more regulated State Capitalism to
less regulated laissez-faire, according to some Poland opted for a market arrangement
that was too open and favored business and the economy over the needs of the majority
of its citizens, a system more in line with laissez-faire and the economic vision of
Hayek.33 In the words of Anna Walentynowicz from an interview in 1999, "We wanted
better money, improved work safety, a free trade union and my job back . . . nobody
wanted a revolution. And when I see what the so-called revolution has brought -- mass
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poverty, homelessness, self-styled capitalists selling off our plants and pocketing the
money -- I think we were right."34
The above statement from Walentynowicz may reflect the desires of some Poles
for a better life and improved economic conditions for all people of Poland, not hypercompetitive free market capitalism with profits funneling towards a number of elite
private business owners. Kowalik mirrors the sentiments of Walentynowicz with the
passage,
Shifting income (and property) from the poor to the rich, making about three
million workers redundant with small chance of finding work, and concealing the
dimensions of lower employment among disability pensioners and earlier retirees
(from 1.5 to 2 million) also meant lower prestige of work, a worse position of the
workers, and the deterioration of workplace hygiene and safety. The backbone of
the working class was broken, the trade union movement was weakened, and for
many years offering work for low wages was sanctioned.35
As can be seen in the passage above, Kowalik offers a harsh critique of the economic
shock therapy that was put into place for the betterment of the Polish economy, but also
with the intention of creating capital for investors and those in positions of power and
influence. After the free elections many of the nomenklatura were replaced at the
governmental level, but many were able to secure positions of power and influence in the
business world.36 Kowalik refers to these nomenklatura turned business men as “red
cobwebs”, claiming that many individuals with PZPR connections and government
positions were well suited for the transition to capitalism though private business
operations.37 Beyer contends that the wage gap in Poland is too wide and states, “The
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salaries of managers in Poland today are anywhere from twenty to fifty tomes greater
than the nation’s average.”38
In the preface of Class Struggle in Classless Poland the publisher39 relays the fact
that United States president Ronald Reagan was quick to support the Solidarity
movement.40 A supporter of free market capitalism, Reagan domestically was not a
proponent of labor movements, but in the context of the cold war and aligning the United
States with any opponent of the Soviet Union, Reagan voiced publically his support for
Solidarity labor union.41 The labor movement in Poland was fighting for some of the
same basic workplace rights and benefits that the Reagan administration denied to
American workers. One example of this is the breaking up of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) in 1981 by the Reagan administration.42 When the
controllers went on strike in hopes of gaining more pay, a shorter work week, and better
working conditions, the Reagan administration did everything in its power to break the
American trade union, while simultaneously supporting the Polish trade union
Solidarity.43 The publisher of Starski’s book goes on to state, “Hopefully the readers of
this book will see analogies not between Reagan and Walesa, where there are none, but
between Reagan and Brezhnev; between the Polish miners in Silesia and U.S. miners in
Appalachia; between Poles as a nation trying to extricate themselves from Soviet
domination and Salvadorians as a nation trying to extricate themselves from U.S.
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domination.”44 This passage provides pause for reflection on what exactly the Solidarity
movement was and who can legitimately evoke its ethos.
The above paragraph provides one example of how the narrative of Solidarity was
manipulated and used for political reasons. The publisher of Starski’s book states, “The
Polish revolution upheavals addressed by this book are of world historic importance, yet
there is considerable confusion about exactly why this is so. People with different
motives equally pronounce their solidarity with the Polish resistance movement.”45 This
double standard shows the willingness of politicians, economists, and other elite groups
to use the narrative of the Solidarity movement as a rallying point for their ideological
agenda.
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CHAPTER 6
SURVEY METHODOLOGY

In order to gather the views and opinions of Polish nationals, I created an online
survey. My motivation for conducting a survey was to gather views and opinions to see
how they compare to books, scholarly articles, museum exhibits, movies, and other
sources of information I have been using for this research. I used a web-based survey on
the website Survey Monkey in order to reach a large group of participants. I created one
version of the survey in English and one version in Polish. My father-in-law helped me
translate the English survey into Polish. For other translations, such as translating
answers from participants, I used Google translate to get a rough idea of what the
participant was saying and then asked my father-in-law or mother-in-law to help with any
further translations. The survey was submitted to the ETSU Institutional Review Board
(IRB) and evaluated to confirm that proper IRB procedures and protocols were designed
into the study. One requirement of the IRB was that participants remained anonymous,
so names were not collected in this survey.
The survey featured forty-four questions about the Solidarity movement. These
questions were preceded by ten preliminary questions to gather personal information
about each participant in the categories of sex, age, current nation of residence, level of
education, income, political beliefs, religion, and level of religious activity. The last
question in the personal information section asked if the participant had been personal
involved in the Solidarity movement. The questions were grouped into the broad
categories of general, prominent people, media, economics, politics, religion, and
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education. The survey concluded with a free write section where participants could share
any additional information that they felt was relevant to the topic. The criteria I set for
eligible participants was that they be at least eighteen years of age and either possess
Polish citizenship or identify as a Polish national.1 These wide and open-ended
parameters allowed my survey to reach as many potential voices as possible.
I sent out the survey by email to friends and family of mine who fit the abovementioned criteria. In the email I asked for recipients to forward the survey to friends,
family, and colleagues who met the criteria and would possibly be interested in
participating. This method is of research is known as Snowball sampling. When the
survey was closed on March 19, 2013, 121 participants had completed the survey, of
which 80 (66 percent) chose the Polish language survey and 41 (34 percent) chose the
English language survey. Combining the information from both the English and the
Polish survey I was able to add together the results from each question to create
percentages and statistics that appear in the “Survey Results and Analysis” section of this
paper.
When adding together the results for percentages, I rounded up for numbers above
.5 and down for numbers below .5 to avoid triple digit percentages. If the number of
participants who skipped a question was over 25 percent, a number of participants that I
have determined to be significant, than I made a note. I used the program Microsoft Excel
to create the graphs that appear in this paper. Some of the questions in the survey asked
for written responses, and a collection of noteworthy written responses have been used in
this paper.

1

Definition of “Polish National” explained later in this chapter.
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I realize that the survey method has some drawbacks. Because this survey was
only accessible online, potential participants may have been excluded because they may
not have had access to a computer or were not computer literate during the time I was
conducting my research for this thesis. I was not able to travel to Poland during my
thesis work, but ideally it would have been beneficial to hand out paper surveys to those
who are not technically savvy. Also this method requires participants to be literate and
therefore does not take into consideration the opinions of those who cannot read or write.
These individuals and groups no doubt have opinions that are valid and important to
understanding the Solidarity movement and an attempt will be made to include these
unrepresented individuals in any future research.
For the term “Polish National”, I allowed participants to decide if they perceived
their own identity as being a “Polish national” or not. This was no doubt easy for those
living in Poland who are obviously Polish citizens, but where the issue can become more
opaque is in instances of immigration where individuals who have been born in or lived
in Poland have moved to another country to take up residence. In an effort to include
those who may have lived through the events of Solidarity but are no longer residing in
Poland, this was left open to interpretation by participants and not just a matter of what
was stated on their passport.
Another factor that must be addressed is that only people who were opinionated
or interested enough in the topic of Solidarity may have chosen to participate. While it is
impossible to gauge the views and opinions of a nation as a whole, a group, or even a
single individual, this survey can record opinions and views of individuals are
comfortable sharing. Some views and opinions may not be shared, as in some cases what
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is thought privately is not always shared publically. Although the survey was
confidential according to the requirements of the IRB and names were not associated
with survey results, this assurance may not have guaranteed completely unguarded
responses. Participants were able to skip answering a question if they did not want to
share their answer. My statistics can only speak for those who shared their answers on
any given question. Penn relates to the challenge of understanding the lives and views of
others with the statement, “There can be a great distance between lived experience and
the observation of that experience. At times, the distance is unbridgeable.”2
One final factor has to do with the creation of this survey and the views and
perspective of its designer, Nathan Peter-Grzeszczak Buhr. In the book Reflective
Interviewing: A Guide to Theory & Practice, Kathryn Roulston states, “The task of
considering the self in qualitative inquiry is a continuously evolving and ongoing task,
and will never be completed. Yet as interviewers, qualitative researchers need to be
aware of who they are in relation to research projects, and how that might be theorized in
way that are consonant with there epistemological and theoretical assumptions about
knowledge production.”3 While I have attempted to be as objective as possible, I have
chosen the questions and wording of the survey according to what I felt was important.
The structure of the survey plays a role in the process of this research, in addition to my
interpretations of the data. I have made countless decisions on how to conduct this
research that makes this project unique, but I have also followed many academic
guidelines and practices provided to me by the IRB and my Masters of Arts in Liberal
studies core curriculum.
2

Penn, Solidarity’s Secret, 311.
Kathryn Roulston, Reflective Interviewing: A Guide to Theory & Practice (Los Angeles, Sage
Publications, 2010),127.
3
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Using these surveys, I have gathered a wide group of viewpoints from participants
with diverse backgrounds. With these issues and concerns on methodology addressed,
the opinions and views that have obtained helped me to better understand how Polish
nationals view the Solidarity movement today.
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CHAPTER 7
SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The opening question, listed on the survey as question two (Q2), participants were
asked if they were male or female to which 56% identified as male and 43% as female
(See figure 1).
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Figure 1. Sex of Participants
Indicated by question three (Q3) participants range in age with 4 percent identifying as
18-24, 19 percent identifying as 25-34, 12 percent identifying as 35-44, 21 percent
identifying as 45-54, 33 percent identifying as 55-64, 8 percent identifying as 65-74 and
no participants identifying as older than 75 (see figure 2). This places roughly 76 percent
of participants over the age of 18 in 1980, the year in which the Solidarity movement
began.
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Figure 2. Age of Participants
Question four (Q4) asked participants “Where do you currently live” to which 44
percent responded Poland, 44 percent responded in the United States, 7 percent
responded Canada, 2 percent responded Germany, and 3 percent cited other countries
(see figure 3). As can be seen, 88 percent are from either Poland or the USA.
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Figure 3. Location of Participants
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On the topic of education (Q5), 15 percent of participants had a high school
education, 20 percent had a bachelor’s degree, 38 percent had a master’s degree, and 27
percent had a doctorate degree (see figure 4).
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Figure 4. Education Level of Participants
For income I split up the question into two parts. The first part (Q6) dealt with
annual income in Polish złoty (see figure 5) and the second part (Q7) asked for
participant’s annual income in United States dollars (see figure 6). The exchange rate on
April 1, 2013, was 3.25 Polish złoty to 1 United States Dollar.1 The following Figures 5
and 6 show the number of participants who chose each income bracket.

1

Currency Converter Google Finance, US Dollar to Polish złoty,
https://www.google.com/finance/converter?a=1&from=USD&to=PLN&meta=ei%3Dbi1aUfD6OqOclwOZ
jwE (accessed April 1, 2013).
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Figure 5. Annual Income in Złoty
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Figure 6. Annual Income in USD
When participants were asked the question (Q8) “How would you describe your
political beliefs,?” 32 percent of identified as liberal, 31 percent identified as
conservative, 31 percent as non-political, 4 percent as socialist, 2 percent as anarchist,
and 1 percent as nationalist (see figure 7).
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Figure 7. Political Beliefs of Participants
To the question (Q9) “What religion do you identify with,?” 65 percent of
participants identified as Catholic, 15 percent as Christian, 18 percent as non-religious, 1
percent as Jewish, and 1 percent as Buddhist (see figure 8).
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Figure 8. Religious Identity of Participants
In reference to the multiple choice question (Q10) “How often do you attend
church,?” 7 percent of participants attend more than once a week, 30 percent attend one
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time a week, 18 percent attend once a month, 16 percent attend once a year, 4 percent less
than once a year and 25 percent do not attend (see figure 9). This shows that 75 percent
of participants are at least involved to some degree with church or religious activities.
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Figure 9. Frequency of Church Attendance by Participants
To the question (Q11)“Were you personally involved with the Solidarity
movement during the time period of 1980-1990?” 35 percent of participants answered yes
and 64 percent answered no (see figure 10). Once again, 76 percent of participants
marked that they were 35 or older, and therefore would have been over the age of 18 in
1980.
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Figure 10. Participants Involved Personally With Solidarity
Starting with some general questions about the Solidarity movement, Q12 asks
participants “My overall view of the Solidarity movement (1980-1990) in Poland is?” to
which 68 percent answered very positive, 22 percent percent said somewhat positive, 9
percent said neutral, and 1 percent said somewhat negative (see figure 11). For this
question, 36 percent percent of participants declined to answer. This question reports that
90 percent of participants have some level of positive feelings about the solidarity
movement.
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Figure 11. View of Solidarity
When asked the question (Q13) “When you think about the Solidarity movement,
what time period do you focus on?” most participants stated 1980-1981 with 68 percent
answering the previously mentioned years, while 26 percent mentioned 1982-1990 (see
figure 12).
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Figure 12. Time Period Most Focused On
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This shows that the beginning years of Solidarity is the time period that most
participants associate with the movement. The 1980-1981 time period in Poland began
with unrest and strikes that lead to the formation of Solidarity and ended with martial law
during the 1982-1990 time period Solidarity was underground. This is important because
participants may not be thinking about the same events in the history of Solidarity, and
therefore may be basing their answers on differing events. In response to the question
(Q14) “When you think about the Solidarity movement, what event do you focus on
most?” 44 percent answered “Strikes at the Lenin Shipyard” 32 percent answered
“Marital Law”, and 24 percent answered “Roundtable Talks” (see figure 13).
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Figure 13. Solidarity Event Most Focused On
These three events can roughly be summarized as the emergence of the Solidarity
movement, the struggle of the Solidarity movement, and success of the Solidarity
movement. While slightly more participants chose the beginning of the movement as
most noteworthy, there is no consensus as to what is the most important time of the
movement.
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When asked if they agreed with the statement (Q15) “The history and story of the
Solidarity movement has changed over time” 44 percent strongly agreed, 30 percent
somewhat agreed, 20 percent were neutral, 3 percent somewhat disagreed, and 6 percent
strongly disagreed (see figure 14).
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Figure 14. History of Solidarity Has Changed
This shows that 74 percent of participants perceive the narrative to be changing
with time. Fifty-two percent of those who took the poll in Polish strongly agreed with
this question while the English participants were less resolute with the average of answer
falling between neutral and somewhat agree.
The next question (Q16) was a follow up to Q15 asking participants to state how
they perceived the history of Solidarity to have changed over time. A male, 55 to 64 year
old, liberal, non-religious, PhD from Canada, who was involved as a member of the
Solidarity Movement wrote, “What started as an unadulterated movement, over the years
it transitioned into self serving platform for political and personal gains.”2 This statement

2

All responses are anonymous. Q16 English survey, #1, March 18, 2013. 12:38 PM.
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reflects a view that some participants may have that the movement began as an idealistic
challenge of the status quo but became corrupted over time. This participant also feels
that the Solidarity Movement was used by individuals for career advancement or to
support ideological arguments instead of reflecting the views and opinions of a large
section of the Polish population, as it once had. Beyer backs up this viewpoint with the
statement, “Many of the heroes of the former egalitarian Solidarity era actually believed
that ‘creating a dominant class, in which they themselves might be key players, was in
the long-term interest of workers’.”3 A female, 25-34 year old, liberal, “Less than once a
year” Catholic, living in the United States who was not involved in the Solidarity
movement writes, “People today don’t realize the impact it had on communism and it is
not emphasized in World History (as a lot of history is not) in high school. I feel very
few people with an average education (or focused education) know about it and what it
did for the countries that were affected by communism.”4 This participant bemoans what
she sees as a loss of interest and understanding of the Solidarity movement that has
occurred over time. In her opinion this does not make the story and narrative less
relevant today but instead in need of higher quality teaching to promote increased
understanding in all academic disciplines.
Moving on to questions about people involved with the Solidarity movement,
question 17 (Q17) asked participants “How would you describe your overall personal
views of Lech Wałęsa?” Twenty-eight percent stated very positive, 38 percent stated
somewhat positive, 8 percent stated neutral, 18 percent stated somewhat negative, and 9

3
4

Beyer, Recovering Solidarity, 34.
All responses are anonymous. Q16 English survey, #14, March 1, 2013. 7:04 PM.
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percent stated very negative (see figure 15). This question shows that 66 percent of
participants hold a view of Lech Wałęsa that falls within the positive spectrum.
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Figure 15. Overall Views of Lech Wałęsa
When asked (Q18) “How would you describe your personal views of Lech Wałęsa before
he became president (pre-1990)?” 52 percent stated very positive, 34 percent stated
somewhat positive, 11 percent stated neutral, 2 percent stated somewhat negative, and 2
percent stated very negative (see figure 16).
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Figure 16. View of Lech Wałęsa Before Presidency
This question reports that 86 percent of participants have some degree of positive
personal view of Lech Walesa before he became president of Poland.
When asked (Q19) about views of Lech Wałęsa after he became president (post1990) only 6 percent stated very positive, 26 percent stated somewhat positive, 14
percent stated neutral, 34 percent states somewhat negative, and 19 percent stated very
negative (see figure 17).
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Figure 17. View of Lech Wałęsa After He Became President
These statistics displaying only 32 percent of participants holding a positive view of
president Wałęsa show a loss of support by the Polish people. As many scholars have
written and as my statistics attest, if Lech Wałęsa had ended his career as an activist
instead of going on into politics, he would be remembered in a more positive and less
controversial way by the Polish people today. According to my survey (Q20), over half
of my participants (56 percent) view the beginning of Solidarity as the most important
time in the career of Lech Wałęsa, while 28 percent focus on the years 1982-1990, and
only 11 percent focus on his presidency followed by 5 percent on his post-presidency (see
figure 18).
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Figure 18. Life Period of Lech Wałęsa Most Focused On
This shows that a majority of participants (84 percent) give more attention to the prepresidency activities of Lech Wałęsa than during or after his presidency.
When asked (Q21) about personal views of Anna Walentynowicz 27 percent of
participants responded very positive, 14 percent responded somewhat positive, 45 percent
responded neutral, 10 percent responded somewhat negative, and 5 percent responded
very negative (see figure 19).
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Figure 19. View of Anna Walentynowicz
This neutrality could be a reflection of the less prominent role that Walentynowicz played
in the movement. According to Penn, Walentynowicz was instrumental in the early days
of the movement, but she never developed a leadership position in Solidarity and was
therefore overshadowed by Lech Walesa and other leaders.5 The words of
Walentynowicz in reference to the strike of August 14, 1980, “a man came to pick me up
and he said the workers wanted me to lead the strike. I said to him that I didn’t want to
do it because if a woman becomes the head of a strike, it will diminish the seriousness of
the event. If I had become head of the strike, people would have said, ‘Women, back to
your pots’.”6
The next question (Q22) asked participants about personal views of General
Wojciech Jaruzelski to which 3 percent answered very positive, 13 percent somewhat
positive, 14 percent neutral, 23 percent somewhat negative, and 47 percent very negative
(see figure 20).
5
6

Penn, Solidarity’s Secret, 61.
Ibid.
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Figure 20. View of General Wojciech Jaruzelski
These statistics show that 70 percent of participants feel a degree of negativity towards
General Jaruzelski, likely stemming from his role in the declaration of martial law in
1981. Because of his role in martial law, he may be seen by a majority of participants as
a puppet of the Soviet Union, who acted in the interests of the USSR, instead of the
interests of Poland. This could also be a reflection of the role that General Jaruzelski
occupied as one of the main opposition figures to the Solidarity movement, which 90
percent of participants reported some level of positive feelings about.
The next question (Q23) asked “Are there any other people that were involved
with the Solidarity movement that you wish to comment on?” Participants most
commonly mentioned the names Andrzej Gwiazda, Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnick, and
Władysław Frasyniuk. All four individuals were involved with Solidarity in positions of
leadership. Andrzej Gwiazda was an engineer and noteworthy leader of Solidarity, Jacek
Kuroń was involved with starting KOR and a prominent social and political figure in
opposition of the PZPR, Adam Michnick was an intellectual and harsh critic of
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communism, and Władysław Frasyniuk was a leader of Solidarity turned politician. One
male, doctorate, libertarian, Christian, age 35 to 44, living in Poland who was not
involved in the Solidarity movement stated, “it is worth recognizing the contributions of
many less known or even completely unknown activists whose participating on the
movement accelerated communism’s downfall.”7 Through this statement he is
attempting to highlight that many people involved with the movement never were
formally recognized or granted leadership or political positions as a result of their
participation. This statement helps to show that credit for the success of the movement
should be awarded to the large number of regular Polish citizens who helped to bring
about change in their homeland.
The following question (Q24) asked participants to name people who were
opposed to the movement to which the names Czesław Kiszczak, Jerzy Urban, and
General Wojciech Jaruzelski were the most often mentioned individuals and PZPR
members along with secret police the were most often mentioned groups. Czesław
Kiszczak was minister of the interior during the presidency of General Wojciech
Jaruzelski.8 One male, age 25 to 34, Catholic, university graduate, living in Poland who
was not involved in the Solidarity movement stated “Jerzy Urban – leader of communist
propaganda, good example of a man who made good money on being loyal to his
master.”9 Jerzy Urban is a Polish media mogul and politician who used to be in charge of
promoting communist policy and ideology. On the topic of Urban, Ash states, “the
former (communist) government spokesman Jerzy Urban, now publisher of a highly
scurrilous and commercially successful weekly called Nie (No), published a selection of
7

All responses are anonymous. Q23 English survey, #9, March 3, 2013. 2:45 PM.
Ash, The Polish Revolution, 371.
9
All responses are anonymous. Q16 English survey, #6, March 3, 2013. 11:13 AM.
8
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all the horrible things Wałęsa’s old-new allies had said about him since 1990,
sarcastically entitled ‘Wałęsa’s a monster, so vote for him’.”10 As can be seen from the
title, this article shows a clear dislike for Lech Wałęsa and as Urban was a representative
of the PZPR it is easy to see that he was opposed to the Solidarity movement.
When participants were asked (Q25) how they feel the Solidarity movement is
represented in Polish culture today, 14 percent responded very positive, 31 percent
somewhat positive, 30 percent neutral, 21 percent somewhat negative, and 5 percent very
negative (see figure 21).
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Figure 21. How Solidarity is Represented in Polish Culture Today
This displays that participants possess views ranging from positive to negative on how
the Solidarity movement is portrayed and depicted in Poland today. When presented the
question (Q26) “How do Polish media companies, portray the Solidarity movement
(1980-1990) today?,” 29 percent of participants responded very positive, 28 percent

10

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 377.
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somewhat positive, 28 percent neutral, 12 percent somewhat negative, and 2 percent very
negative (see figure 22).
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Figure 22. How Polish Media Portrays Solidarity
This shows favoritism towards positive with 57 percent of participants viewing some
level of overall positive portrayal of the Solidarity movement by Polish media. In
response to a similar question (Q27) about how Lech Wałęsa is portrayed by Polish
media companies only 5 percent responded very positive, 22 percent responded
somewhat positive, 33 percent responded neutral, 35 percent responded somewhat
negative, and 6 percent responded very negative (see figure 23).

85

How	
  Polish	
  Media	
  Portrays	
  Lech	
  
Wałęsa	
  	
  	
  	
  
40%	
  
35%	
  
30%	
  
25%	
  
20%	
  
15%	
  
10%	
  
5%	
  
0%	
  
Very	
  Negative	
   Somewhat	
  
Negative	
  

Neutral	
  

Somewhat	
   Very	
  Positive	
  
Positive	
  

Figure 23. How Polish Media Portrays Lech Wałęsa
This shows that 41 percent of participants that felt the media portrayed Wałęsa in a
negative way to some extent and only 27 percent felt that the media portrayed him in a
positive way to some extent, but a notable amount were neutral as well.
The final question (Q28) in the media section asked participants for additional
comments on the topic of the Solidarity movement and the media. One male participant,
age 35 to 44, Christian, doctorate, residing in Poland answered, “The media are
notoriously unreliable in this respect. There is hardly any serious investigation of the
movement, of its political program, of internal differences, of adopted strategies etc.”11
This statement expresses a distrust of the media and a disapproval of the way in which
Polish media addresses the topic of the Solidarity movement and its accomplishments and
shortfalls. Another participant who identified as a man, age 45 to 54, conservative,
Catholic, living in Poland who holds a masters degree and was involved with the
Solidarity movement commented, “Currently, Solidarity and the trade union movement is
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destroyed and marginalized by the media”.12 This statement was opposed by another
participant who identified as a man, age 55 to 64, liberal, Catholic, living in Poland,
holding a doctorate degree, who was not involved with the Solidarity movement stated,
“media very well presented trade union movement, which was becoming more and more
demanding.”13 These two comments show some level of disagreement on what the role
of the Polish media is in telling the story of the Solidarity movement, and supporting
labor unions. Being that media outlets are diverse and hold differing opinions, views of
the Solidarity movement, and labor unions presumably vary depending on the ideological
leanings of the media company.
The next set of questions is on the topic of economics. When asked the question
(Q29) “Unity among the Polish people changed in a negative way by the switch from
Socialism to Capitalism” 28 percent of participants strongly agreed, 37 percent somewhat
agreed, 13 percent responded neutral, 16 percent somewhat disagreed, and 7 percent
strongly disagreed (see figure 24).
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Figure 24. Unity Among Poles Changed in a Negative Way by the Switch from
Socialism to Capitalism
Thus 65 percent of participants agreed to some degree that the transition from socialism
to capitalism affected rapport in a negative way amongst Poles. This statistic reflects
possible reservations held by participants that a capitalist economic system might not
always promote the closest ties between country people, who are put into competition for
goods and resources in the marketplace. Beyer believes that “Solidarity has been swept
away by the new tides of capitalism in the minds of most contemporary Poles.”14
The next question (Q30) asked participants if they believed that some individuals
or groups were more positively affected by the switch to capitalism than others, to which
53 percent responded strongly agree, 40 percent responded somewhat agree, 5 percent
responded neutral, 1 percent somewhat disagree, and 1 percent strongly disagree (see
figure 25).
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Figure 25. Some Poles Were More Positively Affected by the Switch to
Capitalism
This reveals that 93 percent of participants feel to a certain degree that some groups or
individuals received a disproportionately positive outcome from the switch to capitalism.
Some of the more common groups listed in the comments section were business people,
entrepreneurs, government officials, and young people. The question (Q31) asking the
reverse, whether some Poles were more negatively affected by the switch to capitalism,
37 percent strongly agreed, 46 percent somewhat agreed, 8 percent were neutral, 9
percent somewhat disagreed, and 1 percent strongly disagreed (see figure 26).
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Figure 26. Some Poles Were More Negatively Affected by the Switch to
Capitalism
This puts 83 percent in some degree of agreement that the switch to capitalism negatively
affected some Poles and commonly mentioned in the comments section were older
people, the working class, uneducated, rural people, and farmers.
To the question (Q32) “The people of Poland were properly prepared for the
economic switch to capitalism”, 3 percent strongly agreed, 12 percent somewhat agreed,
20 percent were neutral, 42 percent somewhat disagreed, and 25 percent strongly
disagreed (see figure 27).
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Figure 27. Poles Were Properly Prepared for the Switch to Capitalism
This indicates that 67 percent of participants believe to some degree that the people of
Poland were not well prepared for the switch to capitalism. Those participants who were
familiar with the “economic shock therapy” were asked (Q33) their opinion of the plan to
which 25 percent strongly agreed, 14 percent somewhat agreed, 52 percent were neutral,
5 percent somewhat disagreed, and 3 percent strongly disagreed (see figure 28).
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Figure 28. View of Economic Shock Therapy Plan
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The large number of neutral responses, over half, could be due to the opaque nature of
economics and the likelihood that the average Pole may not have heard about or studied
the Balcerowicz plan in detail. This neutrality could be a reflection of indifference or
lack of understanding of the plan or its objectives by the majority of the population.
However, 39 percent tended to agree to some extent with the plan. One participant who
identified as a male, doctorate, Christian, libertarian, age 35-44, earning more than
75,000zł a year and residing in Poland stated, “While details are certainly debatable, the
communist system simply went bankrupt. Shock was not an effect of remedies but a
result of economic catastrophe caused by communism. As on participant stated,
regarding so-called shock therapy: ‘You shouldn't walk through shit slowly, you have to
take a leap’.”15 This participant’s statement frames shock therapy and the Balcerowicz
plan as a result of communism.
The following question (Q34) dealt with the Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne
(PGR-y) or “collectivized farms” and if they were discontinued in a satisfactory manner
to which 8 percent strongly agreed that they were, 14 percent somewhat agreed, 31
percent were neutral, 27 percent somewhat disagreed, and 20 percent strongly disagreed
(see figure 29).
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Figure 29. Discontinuation of the PGR-y Collectivized Farms was Done Properly
This shows that just under half (47 percent) of participants feel that the farms were
terminated in an unsatisfactory manner. While those who disagreed with the PGR-y
farms may have been glad that they were disbanded, more participants than not would
have liked to see the situation handled in a better way. As can be seen from Q31, rural
people and farmers were listed commonly as being negatively affected by the switch to
capitalism. On the topic of labor unions playing a positive in Poland today (Q35), 4
percent strongly agreed, 23 percent somewhat agreed, 30 percent were neutral, 27 percent
somewhat disagreed, and 17 percent strongly disagreed (see figure 30).
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Figure 30. Labor Unions Have a Positive Role in Poland Today
This reveals that 44 percent of participants have some degree of negative feelings
towards current labor unions in Poland. To question Q36 which asked participants for
additional comments on the topic of the Solidarity movement and economics, one female,
Doctorate, age 25-34, catholic, who identifies as a liberal, earning between $50,000 and
$100,000 who is living in the United States responded, “I feel like any capitalist nation, it
will take time for Polish people to grow into taking care of themselves again. At the same
time, keeping the unity that made Polish people overcome communism is more difficult
to keep in a setting of "looking out for number one." I just hope that they will be able to
achieve a happy medium, and only then will this have been a success”.16 This statement
relays this participants desire to see a hybrid system of capitalism and socialism enacted
in Poland.
The first question (Q37) in the section on the topic of Politics deals with the
politicization of Solidarity in Poland today to which 38 percent strongly agreed that it
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was politicized, 36 percent responded somewhat agree, 21 percent neutral, 4 percent
somewhat disagree, and 3 percent strongly disagree (see figure 31).
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Figure 31. The Solidarity Movement has Been Politicized in Poland Today
These statistics reports that 74 percent of participants feel that the Solidarity movement
has been politicized to some extent in Poland today. When asked (Q40) how they felt
about the influence of the USSR in Poland from 1980-1990, 80 percent reported very
negative, 11 percent somewhat negative, 6 percent neutral, 1 percent somewhat positive,
and 0 percent very positive (see figure 32).

95

View	
  of	
  USSR	
  Involvement	
  in	
  
Poland	
  From	
  1980-‐1990	
  
90%	
  
80%	
  
70%	
  
60%	
  
50%	
  
40%	
  
30%	
  
20%	
  
10%	
  
0%	
  
I	
  do	
  not	
  
know	
  

Very	
  
Somewhat	
  
Negative	
   Negative	
  

Neutral	
  

Somewhat	
  
Positive	
  

Very	
  
Positive	
  

Figure 32. View of USSR Involvement in Poland From 1980-1990
This is a showing of near total agreement with 91 percent of participant’s believing that
the USSR was to some extent a negative influence on Poland from 1980-1990.
The next set of questions was about the Catholic Church. When asked (Q42)
what they felt current views of the leadership of the Catholic Church in Poland are on the
Solidarity movement 13 percent answered very positive, 35 percent stated somewhat
positive, 27 percent were neutral, 7 percent stated somewhat negative, 1 percent stated
very negative, and 17 percent stated that they did not know (see figure 33).
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Figure 33. View of Solidarity Held by Leadership of Catholic Church in Poland
This shows that close to half of participants (48 percent) feel that the leadership of the
Polish Catholic Church holds some degree of positive view on the Solidarity movement.
To the question (Q43) asking participants to list any religious groups or congregations
that have negative views of the Solidarity movement, a male, age 55-64, conservative,
non-religious, living in the United States who holds a masters degree and was not
personally involved in the Solidarity movement offered the following explanation:
During the Soviet Union oppression of Poland and the development of Solidarity,
the Polish Catholic Church was the only institution providing a kind of asylum for
most citizens. Everyone, except the politicians and the police regime, had a
common enemy – USSR. People in vast numbers felt united by the church, found
protection and hope within its walls. Once Poland became an independent
country from Soviet control. The role of the church became less vital. Thus, some
religious groups or congregations may indirectly blame Solidarity for its troubles,
e.g. smaller turnout at Sunday mass.17
This statements relays the sentiments of some Catholics who look back fondly to the
unity, power, and purpose that the Polish Catholic Church commanded during the
17
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Solidarity movement and the opposition of the PZPR, USSR, and communism.
According to this participant, once the opponents that Solidarity opposed began to
subside, rallying though the Catholic Church became less necessary. Another participant,
male, age 45-54, conservative, catholic, living in the United States, holding a masters
degree, who was not involved in the Solidarity movement, mentioned Radio Marya and
the redemptionists as a group that had negative views of the Solidarity movement.18 The
following question (Q44) asked participants to name certain groups or congregations that
have positive views of the Solidarity movement to which most answered that the majority
of those involved with the Polish Catholic Church do. These two questions (Q43 & Q44)
help to highlight the fact that different religious groups in Poland today hold varying
views of the Solidarity movement.
To the statement (Q45) “According to some interpretations, Catholic teaching
calls for solidarity with the poor. This is being addressed in Poland today” 6 percent of
participants strongly agreed, 26 percent somewhat agreed, 20 percent were neutral, 20
percent somewhat disagreed, and 20 percent strongly disagreed (see figure 34).
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Figure 34. Solidarity With the Poor in Being Addressed in Poland Today
Of those who chose to agree or disagree 40 percent were on the disagree spectrum and 36
percent were on the agree spectrum which proves to be a fairly even spread. According
to a study cited by Beyer, “the latest research shows and increase in recent years in the
number of Catholics who think that bishops and clergy should take a public stance
regarding unemployment (72.6 percent) and social inequalities (70 percent).”19 The
question Q46 asked whether the Catholic Church should be involved with the economy
of Poland, to which 4 percent of participants strongly agreed, 13 percent somewhat
agreed, 6 percent were neutral, 22 percent somewhat disagreed, and 55 percent strongly
disagreed (see figure 35).
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Figure 35. The Catholic Church Should be Involved in the Economics of Poland
This question shows that 77 percent of participants feel to some degree that the Catholic
Church should not be involved with the economics of Poland.
When asked (Q47) if the Polish Catholic Church should be involved with the
politics of Poland 6 percent of participants strongly agreed, 10 percent somewhat agreed,
5 percent were neutral, 10 percent somewhat disagreed, and 68 percent strongly disagreed
(see figure 36).
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Figure 36. The Catholic Church Should be Involved With the Politics of Poland
This reveals that 78 percent of participants believe that the Polish Catholic Church should
not have a role in Polish politics. The previous statistic is backed up by a study cited by
Beyer that reported, “The majority (of Poles) still argue that the Church should not
become ‘entangled in politics.’ Furthermore, a majority of Catholics (57.3 percent)
believe that the Church should not comment on government policies.”20 Beyer argues
that if the Catholic Church is to effectively advocate for the poor than the church must be
involved with the politics of Poland and that “the church is called to be the critical
conscious of society”.21 While Poles who are actively involved with the Catholic Church
may be more comfortable with the churches involvement in the politics of Poland, other
Poles may disagree. Poles who are on the fringes of the Catholic Church, or who have
left the faith, or who belong to other religious traditions are likely to hold a negative view
the role of the Catholic Church in the Politics of Poland.
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Question Q48 asked participants if “The Solidarity movement could not have
succeeded without the help of the Polish Catholic Church?” to which 50 percent of
participants strongly agreed, 35 percent somewhat agreed, 7 percent were neutral, 6
percent somewhat disagreed and 1 percent strongly disagreed (see figure 37).
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Figure 37. Solidarity Could Not Have Succeeded Without the Help of the
Catholic Church
This question displays that 85 percent of participants believe that the Polish Catholic
Church was important to varying degrees to the success of the Solidarity movement. The
last question (Q49) in the religion section asked for any additional comments from
participants on the topic of Solidarity and religion, to which a female, 55 to 64, high
school graduate, non-political, catholic, living in the United States who was involved
with the Solidarity movement stated, “The church should stay in the opposition to the
ruling party and defend the rights of the poor and the workers. Lean how to live with
dignity and fairness according to the bible.”22 Another participant who identified as a
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female, age 35 to 44, conservative, catholic, licentiate23, living in the United States who
was not directly involved with the Solidarity movement simply stated, “Religion and
Politics should be separate”.24 In opposition to this statement are the words of a male,
age 45 to 54, conservative, catholic, holding a masters degree, living in Poland who was
involved in directly involved in the Solidarity movement,
Excluding the church and Catholics [Catholic Church] from political life of the
country is the goal of post communist propaganda government (current
government wants to exclude catholic church from governing the country). In the
past the most important people in intellectual environment of the countryside was
the priest, the teacher and the physician (past Polish intelligentsia). It is strange to
that we deprive our priests to talk about the political or economic issues; surely
they are our full citizens. In the past, local government the priests could govern
and now they are not allowed to. Now the current government eliminates the
Catholics from the positions, excluding them from governing jobs under the
slogan of ‘freedom and equality’. Excluding the priests from the influential
groups, groups influencing politics and current government of Poland.25
This participant bemoans the separation of church and state and looks back fondly to a
time in Polish history when the priest was at the center of intellectual and social life in
Poland.
And lastly the survey covered questions on the topic of education. Question Q50
asks “Do you feel that the current curriculum that is being taught in schools on the topic
of the Solidarity movement is fair and accurate?” to which 37 percent of participants
responded I do not know, 0 percent responded strongly agree, 9 percent responded
somewhat agree, 34 percent responded neutral, 11 percent responded somewhat disagree,
and 10 percent responded strongly disagree (see figure 38).
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Figure 38. Curriculum on Solidarity Taught Today in Polish Schools is Accurate
The majority of participants may be familiar with current school curriculum as reflected
by a large amount of neutral and “I do not know” answers. For this reason more
specialized research in this area would be needed for a more definitive answer.
To the question (Q51) “While both workers and intellectuals participated in the
Solidarity movement it was primarily:” 24 percent of participants responded a workers
movement, 8 percent responded an intellectual movement, 66 responded both, and 2
percent responded that they did not know (see figure 39).
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Figure 39. Solidarity Was Primarily
The answers to this question show the reluctance of participants to award the
accomplishments of Solidarity to either the workers or the intellectuals. It is safe to say
that most participants believe that the movement could not have succeeded without the
cooperation of both groups. The last question (Q52) in the grouping on education asked
for additional comments on education and the Solidarity movement to which one female,
age 18-24, non-political, Christian, Licentiate, living in Poland answered, “not enough
time in students history classes is devoted to this topic.”26 Another participant female,
age 18-24, liberal, Christian, Licentiate, who is living in Poland stated “very little is said
about Solidarity in school, teachers do not explore the subject – students learn dry facts,
no details”.27
One woman, age 55 to 64 conservative, catholic, holding a masters degree,
residing in Canada, who was not directly involved with the Solidarity movement stated
on the topic of Solidarity and education,
26
27
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The Solidarity movement fought for the correction of facts concerning Polish
history and to a very large extent contributed to the disclosure of traitors from the
Socialist period. Since the movement started by underground actions, people with
different professions and skills were required. The main achievement of the
Solidarity movement in education is the transformation of the consciousness of
citizens, especially the younger generation, who for many years were adjusted by
systemic brain washing.28
She credits Solidarity for bringing about a restructuring of academics in Poland by
navigating away from the biased curriculum of the socialist era.
The next question (Q53) asked participants if there were groups or individuals
who attempt to overstate or exaggerate aspects of the Solidarity movement, followed by
the question (Q54) “Are there any groups or individuals who try to understate or
minimize aspects of the Solidarity movement?” One participant, a male, age 45 to 54,
conservative, catholic, living in Poland, holding a masters degree, and who participated in
the Solidarity movement stated, “No. It is impossible to exaggerate something that
caused the collapse of communism, the most brutal, destructive and murderous political
system.”29 Another participant, a female, age 35 to 44, conservative, catholic, doctorate,
living in the United States, who was indirectly involved with Solidarity through her father
stated in reference to people who exaggerate the movement, “Certainly there are, for
example, certain members want to take advantage of the legacy of Solidarity movement
for the advancement of political careers.”30 As we can see, depending on the individual
the relevance of the Solidarity movement can vary.
The final question (Q55) asked participants for any thing they would like to
highlight share or clarify about the Solidarity movement to which one male, age 55 to 64,
liberal, non-religious, doctorate, living in Canada, who was personally involved in the
28
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solidarity movement stated, “Solidarity movement was the spark that would set off the
chain of events that eventually dismantled the Soviet Bloc. The pope played a vital role in
this process. And let's not forget Gorbachev. He was the one who pragmatically allowed
the events to proceed rather than counteract them with force. Make no mistake - they
could still inflict a lot of harm, and Reagan would do nothing to stop them.”31
In the words of another participant male, age 25-34, liberal, catholic, doctorate,
living in Poland who was not directly involved with the Solidarity movement, “Many
groups overstate Solidarity as if it was a big master plan for Poland. The truth is that its
main advantage was negative - it was an anti-government movement that helped to bring
down a socialist order. Paradoxically of course, because economic program of Solidarity
was in some parts even more socialist than the program of a Communist Party.”32
According to a woman, age 55 to 64, apolitical, catholic, high school graduate, living in
Germany who was directly involved with the Solidarity movement “Thanks to the Polish
Solidarity not only Poland became a free country, but all of Europe was freed form the
domination of Russia, and Germany could reunite again.”33
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Because the Solidarity movement brought together many Poles of differing
classes, ideologies, educational levels, and political backgrounds, the narrative of
Solidarity is remembered and created in many different ways by Poles today. These
narratives likely support any political and ideological views that an individual may hold,
and may assist in present-day ideological battles. In the words of Ash, “Solidarity
survived as a set of memories, symbols, values, an ethos and a tradition, although there
were, as there had always been, major differences in the interpretation of that ethos and
tradition.”1 According to Jan Kubik in The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of
Power the movement was apolitical in its beginning years and therefore transcended
traditional dividing lines,
Conceptualizing Solidarity as an ascending cultural-political class that came into
existence as a polarizing countercultural discourse before it became a powerful
political force helps one to understand the impossibility of its long-term unity.
Solidarity became such a formidable opponent of Communism because it
managed to mobilize millions of people though a set of ‘apolitical’ symbols and
discourses. They were apolitical in the sense that they were neither ‘left’ or
right’; neither authoritarian nor democratic. But they allowed the huge masses of
people to win back their self-respect and dignity.2
By providing an idealistic set of goals that appealed to many Poles, the Solidarity
movement was able to gain massive support. Through the use of symbols, some of which
include the cross, the Virgin Mary, the pope, flowers, slogans, and monuments, for
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instance those dedicated to the 1956 Poznan workers and another to the 1970 Gdańsk
workers, Solidarity was able to unite and mobilize.3
When thinking about the movement, Poles may focus on different aspects of
Solidarity, as reflected by Q14. Some phenomena that may come to mind are the
political changes that were made, while others may think of independence from the
USSR. Some Poles may primarily see the movement as a class battle of workers against
the government, and yet others may see the movement as bringing economic change to
Poland. While there were many facets to Solidarity, and the movement represented
multiple ideals to different members, in the end the movement was successful by
including and incorporating the hopes and dreams of a diverse group of individuals and
creating unity.
Although the movement provided the Polish people with a great moment of
transcendence this moment did not last and once the PZPR was overcome and communist
system banished Solidarity began to waiver. Kubik states, “The Solidarity
class/movement, united by a common cultural-political vision briefly developed through
the late 1970s, was remarkably monolithic for only a brief moment-in the late summer
and fall of 1980. The cracks in this monolith had already appeared by early 1981. By
1992 it had disappeared almost without a trace.”4 Beyer contends that while Solidarity
was extremely inspiring and idealistic, “Today the vast majority of Poles believe that
Solidarity no longer serves the good of the country as a whole. When the current
president, Lech Kaczyński, refers to Poland as a ‘solidarity state’ his words are devoid of
any real significance. Few people expect the government to translate them into policies
3

4

Kubik, The Power of Symbols, 267-268.
Ibid.,269.

109

that promote the values of Solidarity’s original goals and ethos.”5 While the energy and
actuality may not exist in Poland today, the lessons and ethos of Solidarity survive in the
Polish people.
The Solidarity movement provided many lessons, but it also created concrete
changes in the Nation of Poland. I have pointed out previously in this paper that the
transition from communism to capitalism was not equally beneficial to all Poles. In a
poll cited by Beyer, “A quarter century later, only 24 percent maintained that their lives
had changed for the better as a result of Solidarity’s historic victory, while 31 percent
said that their lives became worse, and 42 percent saw no change whatsoever.”6 Yet
another poll, issued in the early 2000s cited by Kowalik asked Poles the question “when
was life easier - in communist Poland or today?” to which “more than 50 percent of the
respondents preferred the old system and only 11.5 percent the existing one.”7 While
many Poles may have a positive view of the Solidarity movement, the effects and
changes it brought to the country are still being debated today. The shift in economic
systems has created prosperity for some while bringing others poverty.
Members of the Solidarity movement live on and continue to influence life in
Poland today. For example, Lech Wałęsa appears in the news from time to time and
recently made headlines with a statement about gay Polish Politicians in parliament.
Wałęsa stated his thought that gays, as a minority, should sit in the back of the parliament
chamber and perhaps even “behind a wall”. According to a CNN article titled “Lech
Walesa: No Apology for Anti-Gay Comments” by Matthew Day, Wałęsa stated in an
interview that he would not apologies for his comments and that “all I said (was) that
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minorities, which I respect, should not have the right to impose their views on the
majority. I think most of Poland is behind me.”8 One participant mentioned this in a
comment, “Walesa’s comment about the gay among politics” as a negative about the
leader turned politician. As we can see the reputation of Lech Wałęsa is still changing, as
he remains a controversial figure today.
In the view of Beyer, “Solidarity also clearly pursued the rights of political
participation and freedom of expression, which do not belong to the traditional catalogue
of economic, social, and cultural rights. Thus, its egalitarianism pertained to economic,
social, cultural, political, and civil rights. In short, Solidarity believed that ‘bread and
freedom’ are the rights of all human beings.”9 This is universal message that resonates
beyond the borders of Poland. The Polish people came together and provided an amazing
example of what the unity of a group can accomplish, in a movement that was largely
non-violent. In the words of Solidarity Chaplin Józef Tischner, “Solidarity, the one that
is born of the pages of the Gospel, does not need and enemy or opponent to strengthen
itself and grow. It turns towards all and not against anyone.”10
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